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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This report surveys, in Part I, the various aspects of the 
financing of the foreign trade of the English-speaking Caribbean 
countries, including the major institutions involved and the main 
policies and problems. Special mechanisms for trade finance are 
considered in Part II, including the possibilities for using various 
alternative or innovative techniques and policies which might benefit 
the region. A statistical overview of the role of intra-regional and 
extra-regional trade in the economies of the Caribbean countries is 
contained in the Appendix. 
The vast bulk of the export trade of the English-speaking 
Caribbean countries passes through ordinary short-term commercial 
financing and payments channels, largely involving the commercial 
banking system. In addition, in most of the countries of the region, 
there is available, at least in embryonic form, a governmental 
institution which provides credits, guarantees, or insurance, usually 
through the commercial banking system, aimed at facilitating exports — 
but the system is uneven in scope and quality among the countries of 
the region, and there are considerable gaps in coverage. 
As to imports into the region, capital goods are normally financed 
with medium or long-term private export credits (often supported by 
official guarantees or insurance from government agencies in the 
exporting country) or with grants or long-term loans from bilateral or 
multilateral aid institutions. However, the bulk of imports to the 
countries of the region — food, raw materials, and light manufactures 
— normally follow private commercial channels for their financing 
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(although here too short-term pr ivate suppl ier or buyer c r e d i t s are 
sometimes supported by o f f i c i a l guarantees or insurance by the 
exporting country) . 
In surveying trade finance, this report first considers the role 
of officially supported import and export finance, particularly the 
role of export credit and insurance agencies, before considering the 
banking system more generally. In the first- place, it is important to 
try to put into perspective the wide differences among the countries of 
the region in the extent to which they benefit from such official 
support from developed countries for the financing of their imports; 
this support can come in two ways: either 1) in the form of grants or 
loans from aid agencies or 2) in the form of export credits (from 
official agencies, or guaranteed or insured by official institutions in 
the developed countries). 
In 1985, three-fourths of total imports to all developing 
countries came from the OECP (about US$ 300 billion). Of these 
imports, $42 billion (14%) were financed by disbursements of official 
aid from bilateral or multilateral agencies funded by the 17 DAC member 
countries; $25 billion (9%) were financed by disbursements under 
officially supported medium and long-term export credits; and an 
estimated $53 billion (18%) were financed by disbursements under 
officially supported short-term (under one-year) export credits. Thus 
a tot-al of 40% of all imports from OECD countries by all developing 
countries were officially supported in some form. 
As to the individual Caribbean countries, it is clear that with 
regard to aid (other than export credits) as a source of finance for 
imports, the Bahamas and Trinidad receive only negligible amounts, 
Barbados only modest amounts, and Belise, Guyana and Jamaica major 
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amounts. In addition, among the OECS islands, Grenod* and Dominica are 
also highly dependent, on aid flows. 
The estimates for officially supported export credits from O E C D 
countries appear to be highest for Jamaica and Trinidad (and above the 
average for all developing countries), the Bahamas and Belize are 
somewhat less than the average, Barbados is well below average, and 
Guyana is particularly small: these divergences are the result, of 
conflicting motivations on the part of sellers in the OECD countries 
and the formulaters of creditworthiness standards for the export, credit 
agencies in OECD. Thus the high figure for Trinidad reflects a strong 
demand for continued insurance cover there on the part of exporters in 
OECD countries along with a continued willingness to provide such cover 
despite foreign exchange shortages, though some agencies may make a 
surcharge for coverage. The high figure for Jamaica may particularly 
reflect the effect of debt rescheduling exercises there, which take the 
form of providing new gross credits to offset payments due -- so that 
actual new coverage may be far more limited, given the apparently tight 
rules and high surcharges which some export credit agencies are 
applying arid given also the limitations on this type of credit which 
have no doubt been included in the rescheduling exercises. The 
relatively low figure for Barbados may reflect its high 
creditworthiness so that there may be only limited demand for cover. 
The extremely low estimate for Guyana reflects the virtual suspension 
of most export credit insurance cover in the light of the debt 
servicing problems and the accumulated arrears of that country. 
Data on the operation of 19 export credit insurance or guarantee 
agencies in OECD countries for the 5-year period 1982 to 1986 can throw 
light on the performance of similar institutions in t h e Caribbean 
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region. OECD export credit agencies insured or guaranteed about 
U.S.$500 to $600 billion in exports or roughly 10% of their total 
exorts for the five-year period. 60 to 65% of insured exports went to 
developing countries, representing about 25% of all OECD exports to 
developing countries. During the five-year period, the 19 agencies 
incurred losses totalling US$ 10.5 billion, or about '¿% of total value 
insured — which can be viewed as a subsidy cost, originating from 
competitive pressures, which may have expanded the volume of exports 
and may have benefited buyers. However, most of the agencies professed 
to aim at making profits or breaking even on most of their insurance 
and guarantee services, and the losses reflect both rising claims and a 
declining trend in the value of insured exports (at least in part the 
result of declining exports from OECD to developing countries, which in 
turn may be largely attributable to the debt crisis in developing 
countries). 
With respect to the terms for officially supported medium and 
long-term export credits, OECD countries for years had sought to 
restrain the considerable competition which had grown up among 
exporting countries in subsidising the sale of their capital goods 
exports. Finally, the "Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially 
Supported Export Credits," also known as the OECD "Consensus," came 
into force in April 1978 among 22 member countries. It sets limits on 
the terms and conditions for export credits with a duration of two 
years or over and which are officially supported (i.e., "are given, 
subsidized, refinanced, guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies 
in the form of either supplier or buyer credits" [15, p.l]>. In 
i 
general, for most participants, use of the Consensus rates requires a 
subsidy as compared to their own market rates — a subsidy which is 
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thus passed on to the recipient borrowing country. 
In considering financing sources for the Caribbean region which 
may have some possible subsidy element.for imports, and in considering 
competition in credit terms which may face the region's exporters, 
attention also needs to be paid to the growing number of export credit 
institutions in other developing countries. From both these points of 
view it is well to note that non-OECD export finance agencies charge 
typically somewhat lower interest rates than those in the Consensus. 
They also provide buyer credits, typically in US$ at fixed rates — and 
the rates are likely to be standard for all countries. They may also 
provide longer maturities. Finally, export credit cover has not been 
restricted to other developing countries in the way in which OECD 
agencies have cut back in the face of increasing claims and balance of 
payments problems. 
As to the region itself, operations of agencies serving Barbados, 
Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, and the OECS countries, as well as some 
region-wide institutions, are described in some detail in the report, 
below. Only Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad have substantial official 
export credit or insurance operations in the region. Even here, some 
users have complained about high collateral requirements and inadequate 
interest rate subsidies, given the high priority for exports and the 
nature of foreign competition in credit terms. New region-wide 
developments in the form of a Caribbean Export Bank should play a 
much-needed role in broadening and improving export credit support and 
insurance throughout the region. 
For the region as a whole, the dominant feature of the commercial 
-i 
banking system is the very prominent role of branch offices or 
subsidiaries of major multinational banking institutions — 
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particularly Canadian and British. General 1?/, the commercial banks in 
most of the region have recently been highly liquid, which has meant 
relatively low interest rates for depositors; at the same time, lending 
rates to borrowers have remained high — and the spread between the two 
rates has grown. Some government officials have expressed the hope 
that the arrival of new more aggressive banks in some parts of the 
region will inject competition into what is in some places a highly 
uncompetitive system — particularly in short-term trade credit. 
Merchant banks play an active role in trade finance in Trinidad & 
Tobago and in Jamaica, adding flexibility to the system; and a well 
financed region-wide merchant bank could fill an important role. 
The role of development banks in various countries of the region 
in fostering export development and of the central banks in regulating 
trade finance, particularly through the exchange contol system, is 
described in the report below. 
As to development banks, there is considerable concern that many 
countries of the region now lack true development banking, with many of 
the institutions effectively negotiating commercial rather than 
development loans. It is difficult to get real export expansion 
» 
without proper development banking, with careful development-oriented 
project evaluations, lending direct to end users, and 
self-collateralised projects; risk taking is needed on new export 
proposals — and venture capital should be forthcoming for good 
projects quite apart from ordinary commercial credit limits which may 
already be fully tied up. 
There is considerable interest in the region in ways to strengthen 
7 
exporters. There has been an undercapitalization of industries in 
general; what is needed, some observers feel, is a refinancing of 
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existing companies on a selective basis — financing them generously. 
Services should be provided to management to help solve existing 
problems which impede efficiency; in some cases this should involve 
direct management help; where management is at least minimally 
competent, then management consultants might be used for a period of 
years, if necessary, to improve the efficiency of firms. As to 
financing to start new ventures aimed at export markets, available 
money is not sufficiently soft to attract the really best source of new 
entrepreneurs -- namely, the large pool of able management personnel 
already working in the region, most of whom simply cannot afford to 
mortgage their houses, deplete all their savings, and give up their 
present well-paid jobs in order to try out some of their new ideas — 
there is simply too much risk of losing everything. What is needed is 
a program to tap this source of entrepreneurship by reducing these 
personal risks, financed partly by grant funds, and made available for 
carefully chosen export projects and carefully chosen people, aimed at 
selling in the extra-regional market. 
A good deal of the effectiveness of export promotion efforts can 
be offset by internally oriented policy measures which reduce the 
ability of exporters to compete effectively in international markets. 
Policy makers for each country, and regionally, need to consider ways 
to shift the relative degree of effective protection toward exports, 
and away from home market bias. They need to consider whether the 
present priority for exporting is adequate, and what positive efforts 
can be undertaken to make exporting more attractive in general, and 
relative to domestic production. 
Exchange contro l i s an area where improvements in p r i o r i t y f o r 
exports should be r e l a t i v e l y easy t o make. Exchange contro l systems in 
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the region (as long as they remain necessary) need to be made le.r:s 
arbitrary , l e s s expensive, and less time consuming, especially for 
exporters — in particular, making sure that the import content of 
exports is given priority over other imports. Where controls in the 
form of negative listings and &Rs remain justified on practical 
employment grounds, the possibility of waivers (even automatic 
exceptions) should be considered — for the purpose of allowing 
exporters maximum flexibility to lower their costs, and improve the 
quality and reliability of their products, thus making exports more 
competitive, and bringing net foreign exchange benefits (and possibly 
even employment benefits) to the country concerned. 
Part II of the report, below, considers various special mechanisms 
in trade finance, beginning with countertade. The term "countertrade" 
covers a wide range of trade practices which link the acquisition of 
imports in part or in full to the reciprocal provision of exports. 
There are a wide variety of types of countertrade, including pure 
barter, counterpurchase, advance purchase, direct or indirect offset 
(or compensation), buy-back agreements, bilateral clearing agreements, 
switch trade, and industrial cooperation. Countertrade is often 
• * 
criticised by economists as being inefficient and leading to a 
misallocation of resources. But countertrade may itself sometimes be a 
means of correcting the distortions brought about by an unsuitable 
(overvalued) exchange rate, in that it permits selective devaluation on 
a case-by-case basis through the informal discounts on exports .which 
are necessary to make countertrade transactions work. 
As t o the c o s t s of countertrade arrangements, these" are l i k e l y t o 
be much higher than the cos ts o f conventional trade f inance (though not 
necessar i ly higher than the penalty cos ts f o r conventional f inance 
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facing developing countries experiencing difficulties in meeting 
external financial obligations). Nevertheless, in intra-trade among 
developing countries suffering from financial stringency, barter deals 
and other countertrade arrangements may avoid foreign exchange 
expenditures., and thus make possible trade which would not otherwise 
occur. Even where countertrade requires costly discounts, high fees to 
intermediaries and expensive international financing, this may be a 
better alternative for a country with severe debt problems than the 
inflated costs of finance for conventional trade facing such countries, 
or than being unable to proceed at all with some trade transactions. 
In other cases, the development impact of foreign investment,joint 
ventures, technology transfer, and the possibility of opening up new 
export markets make some countertrade arrangements attractive to 
developing country governments despite additional costs such 
arrangements may face. 
The Caricom Multilateral Clearing Facility (CMCF), which began in 
June 1977, had to be suspended at the end of March 1983, when the 
credit limit was exceeded, and a major debtor (Guyana) was unable to 
settle the required amount due. The system has since been replaced by 
a series of bilateral clearing agreements, but interest has remained 
keen to restore some sort of multilateral payments arrangement, despite 
the difficulties. One of the issues, where views differ, is the scope 
of trade to be covered by a revived facility, i.e., whether major 
commodities such as oil and petroleum should be included or whether a 
scheme should be limited to so-called non-traditional -exports. Another 
aspect of a revised scheme is whether it should be limited to financing i 
only the value added in the region or, if not, what the cut-off point 
should be for external import content. A further key question is to 
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what extent outside resources might be mobilized to provide financial 
support for a revived scheme -- and how such support might best be used 
to help stretch scarce foreign exchange resources and expand 
intra-regional trade, while maintaining the solvency of the 
arrangement. A special problem in any revival is how to treat the past 
intra-regional debt: could it be liquidated within the mechanisms of 
any new scheme? If arrears grow, what provision would there be in a 
new scheme to pay them off? Can there be an automatic provision for 
shifting hard currency export earnings to balance the clearing scheme's 
books after a certain delay? 
A step toward the longer-run achievement of a common currency 
area, which could provide substantial benefits to all of the countries 
of the region under suitable circumstances, might be the creation of a 
Caricom unit of account (CU), based on a trade-weighted basket of 
currencies. 
As the developing country debt crisis has persisted, various ad 
hoc arrangements have grown up aimed at converting some of the 
outstanding bank loan debt into equity holdings. This has involved, in 
the first place, growth of an established secondary market for 
developing country debt, in which outstanding bank loans can be traded 
among banks themselves (to adjust their country risk exposures) or sold 
to third parties at deep discounts, the size of which depends on the 
prospects of the debtor country concerned. (In the Caribbean region, 
Jamaica announced a debt-for-equity program, with a new unit in the 
central bank to be assigned to this work as of April 1987.). 
A number of innovations in accessing the capital markets of the 
developed countries, some of which have been proposed but not yet 
implemented for developing countries, could be of interest to Caribbean 
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countries. A major objective for the management of external finance is 
to make sure that it contributes to the growth and stability of income, 
and many of the innovations deal with achieving better cash-flow 
matching (at both the enterprise and the national level) — which means 
not only obtaining finance when it is needed, but repaying it at a time 
when the developing country can best afford to do so, taking into 
account the cyclicality and volatility of production, demand, and 
prices of the primary commodities that dominate the exports of most 
developing countries, including the English-speaking Caribbean 
countries. These techniques include, interest and currency swaps, 
combining swaps with export credits, index-linked bonds, and 
commodity-1inked bonds. 
There are major pools of capital in the region, or under control 
of residents of the region, that might be more effectively mobilized 
for regional development. The major trading families have considerable 
financial resources and have made occasional efforts at local 
manufacturing," they remain an important potential source of finance for 
new manufacturing or export ventures and for investment in suitably 
designed regional development institutions. The considerable fund of 
» 
resident capital in the Bahamas should be tapped to help finance export 
development there, and also to help form, for example, a region-wide 
venture capital pool. Unsettled economic conditions in some of the 
largest economies of the region for more than a d e c a d e have led to the 
migration of skilled professionals and entrepreneurs from the region — 
and to a considerable amount of "capital flight" by such persons and by 
persons who continue to reside in the region; it is clear that measures 
to re-attract such capital to the home country or to the region deserve 
serious attention, as well as measures to re-attract' expatriates who 
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could establish or manage export projects, '.-rid even finance them. 
The international community i n trying t o devist.; ways to assure 
adequate compensation for developing countries (particularly those most 
heavily dependent- on one or a few basic commodities) for shortfalls in 
export earnings as compared to projected earnings (measuring this gap 
by deviations from some sort of trend line). The aim of such financing 
is to provide a cushion against the potentially severe repercussions 
from the loss of expected foreign exchange. Expat) si on of compensatory 
financing facilities and the creation of new facilities to complement 
the existing" IMF and STABEX schemes, and focussed particularly on 
commodity export shortfalls, could substantiall?/ assist Caribbean 
countries. 
Other trade financing techniques to be considered include the 
following: (1) The problem of obtaining pre-shipment finance for an 
exporter who does not himself have adequate credit- resources can often 
be solved through the use of back-to-back or transferab1e letters of 
credit. (2) Forfaiting is a form of the familiar banking technique of 
discounting receivables; it usually applies to the bills of exchange or 
promissory notes issued by importers, typically for medium or long-term 
capital goods transactions, and uses funds from the free market to 
provide a form of fixed rate supplier credit- to capital goods 
exporters; a special feature is that when notes are sold to a 
forfaiter, they are sold without recourse to the exporter; a 
guarantee or "aval" by a bank in the buyer's country may be required by 
the forfaiter, thus ensuring that the pricing of the forfait 
•transaction becomes mainly a function of the country risk of the 
-1 
importer who has issued the paper. (3) Private export credit 




A SURVEY OF TRADE FINANCE IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a survey of some of the main problems in the 
financing of the external and intra-regional trade of the thirteen 
English-speaking Caribbean countries, and of possibilities for 
improvement. The study is based on visits by the author to six of 
the countries of the region in October and November 1986, accompanied 
by economists on the staff of the Sub-Regional Office for the 
Caribbean of the UN ECLAC — Mr. George Joiner and Mr. Radcliffe 
Dookie. The mission visited Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, 
Antigua, Bahamas, and Jamaica, and consulted: 1) with government 
officials from Ministries of Commerce, Industry, or Economics, 
Finance Ministries, Central Banks, Development Banks, Export Credit 
and Insurance Institutions, and Investment and Export Promotion 
Agencies; 2) with officials from regional and international 
organizations such as the CARICOM Secretariat, the Caribbean 
Development Bank, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS), UNDP, and UN ECLAC; 3) with officials from the private 
sector, including Chambers of Commerce or Industry, Manufacturers or 
Exporters Associations, Commercial Banks, Merchant Banks, and other 
private businessmen. The author has also consulted with IMF, World 
Bank, UNCTAD, ITC, OECD, ECGD, and U.S. Government officials, aj5 well 
as other economists. 
Part I of this report surveys the various aspects of the 
financing of the foreign trade of Caribbean countries, including the 
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major i n s t i t u t i o n s involved and the main p o l i c i e s and problems. Part 
II considers s p e c i a l mechanisms f o r trade f i n a n c e , inc luding the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r using various a l t e r n a t i v e or innovat ive techniques 
and p o l i c i e s which might b e n e f i t the reg ion . The Appendix t o t h i s 
report contains a s t a t i s t i c a l overview of the r o l e o f i n t r a - r e g i o n a l 
and ex t ra - reg i ona l trade in the economies o f the Caribbean countr ies . 
(There are seven Appendix Tables and three Supplementary Tables . ) 
F inal ly , there i s an extens ive l i s t i n g of b i b l i o g r a p h y and re ferences 
relevant t o t h i s repor t (with some annotat ions ) . 
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Part I: THE FINANCING OF THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 
A. The Scope of Trade Finance. 
The vast bulk of the export trade of the Engl ish-speaking 
Caribbean countr ies passes through ordinary short - term commercial 
f inancing and payments channels, l a r g e l y involv ing the commercial 
banking system (mainly p r i v a t e banks, o f t en branches o f g i a n t 
mult i -nat ional banking operat ions , but in some cases n a t i o n a l l y owned 
i n s t i t u t i o n s ) . This ordinary t rade may invo lve cash payments or 
commercial c r e d i t arrangements. Dealings of e s tab l i shed f i rms with 
longstanding customers may take p l a c e on open account with 
conventional 60, 90, or 180 day payment terms. Traders use standard 
commercial instruments, such as d r a f t s , promissory no tes , and l e t t e r s 
of c r e d i t , with and without bank guarantees. Exporters may prov ide 
c o l l a t e r a l t o obtain pre and post-shipment working c a p i t a l from t h e i r 
banks while awaiting normal payments, or , in order t o ob ta in 
immediate funds, they may d i s count with t h e i r banks the shor t - term 
c r e d i t s they have extended t o t h e i r buyers. In a d d i t i o n , in most o f 
the countr ies of the reg ion , there i s a governmental i n s t i t u t i o n 
which provides c r e d i t s , guarantees, or insurance, u s u a l l y through the 
commercial banking system, aimed at f a c i l i t a t i n g expor ts — but the 
system is uneven in scope and q u a l i t y among the c o u n t r i e s o f the 
region, and there are c ons iderab le gaps in coverage. Some major 
commodity export items from the region — e . g . , petroleum, bauxi te , 
and alumina — may be f inanced as internal corporate t r a n s f e r s o f 
large mult i -nat ional f i rms. 
As t o imports i n t o the reg ion , c a p i t a l goods are normal ly 
Page xi 
financed with medium or long-term private export credits (often 
supported by official guarantees or insurance from government 
agencies in the exporting country) or with grants or long-term loans 
from bilateral or multilateral aid institutions. However, the bulk 
of imports to the countries of the region — food, raw materials, and 
light manufactures — are not durable capital goods, and therefore 
normally follow private commercial channels for their financing 
(although here too short-term private supplier or buyer credits are 
sometimes supported by official guarantees or insurance by the 
exporting country). Acute foreign exchange difficulties, including 
arrears on ordinary commercial trade debt, have led some countries in 
the region to use countertrade arrangements to finance some of their 
imports. 
There is great diversity of the countries of the region in terms 
of area, population, income level, and growth rates of output and 
trade. There is also great diversity in the basic structure of 
import financing, i.e., in the relative importance of earnings from 
merchandise exports, of tourism earnings, and of foreign aid and 
officially supported export credits from abroad in financing imports, 
(as well as in the resulting burden of external indebtedness). These 
differences are described in detail in the Appendix to this report 
(and particularly in Appendix Tables 1, 2, 2A, and 3). 
In addition, three supplementary tables (at the end of this 
report) provide basic information. Tables A and B cover import and 
export trends for individual Caribbean countries during the 1980s 
(including intra-regional exports). Table C provides detailed data 
on the commodity structure of exports for each of 13 countries in the 
region — of particular value in establishing the extent of 
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" t r a d i t i o n a l " vs " n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l " exports in each country. 
In surveying trade finance, this chapter will first consider the 
role of officially supported import and export finance, particularly 
the role of export credit and insurance agencies, before considering 
the banking system more generally. 
B. The Extent of Officially Supported Import Finance from Abroad. 
In considering the impact of official support for exports on the 
trade of the English-speaking Caribbean region, it is important, in 
the first place, to try to put into perspective the wide differences 
among the countries of the region in the extent to which they benefit 
from such official support from developed countries for the financing 
of their imports; this support can come in two ways: either 1) in 
the form of grants or loans from aid agencies or 2) in the form of 
export credits (from official agencies, or guaranteed or insured by 
official institutions in the developed countries). Such information, 
on a gross disbursement basis, has been established (partly 
estimated) for the present study for the flows to all developing 
countries from the 24 OECD countries, and is presented in Table A at 
the end of this report; such data has also been more roughly 
estimated for the six largest countries of the English—speaking 
Caribbean region (and is summarized in the tabulation below).[The 
gross short-term credits were estimated from data available on total 
outstanding short-term credits and on plausible assumptions about the 
average duration of such credits; similar data for individual 
Caribbean countries is not made available, so that the estimates 
below assume that the pattern of relative percentages for medium and 
long-term export credits among these countries (compared to all 
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developing countries) also applies to short-term credits, thus making 
possible an estimate of the rough order of magnitude for official 
support of all kinds.] These estimates are summarized in the 
f o 11 ow i rig tabu 1 at i on : 
Dependence on Official Financing from OECD countries in 198-5 
Percent of Total Imports from OECD Financed by: 
Total Officially Supported Export Gross Esti-
Imports Credits (Gross) Official mated 
(FOB) DAC Flows Total 
from OECD Med. & ShortTerm Total (Excluding Gross 
(US$ mill) LongTerm (estimate)(estimate) ExpCred) Flows 
(1) (2) (3) a) (4)=2+3 (5) (6)=4+5 
All 
Developing 
Countries 297,962 8. 5 ( 18) (27) 14. 0 (40) 
Barbados 297 2. 6 (6) (9) 6. 2 ( 15) 
Bahamas 1, 079 9.0 ( 12) (21) 0. 24 (21) 
Trinidad 928 7.2 (21) (28) 0. 5 (29) 
Guyana 92 1. 1 ( 3 Ì (4) 37. 0 (41) 
Belize 82 2. 1 ( 15) ( 17 ) 27.9 ( 45) 
Jamaica 614 16.6 b) (16) (33) b) 58. 7 (91) 
a) Individual country estimates based on 1983-85 average for medium 
and long-term export credits, except for Belize and Jamaica which are 
based on the 1979-83 average. 
b) May be inflated by inclusion within total "gross disbursements" of 
some disbursements under debt rescheduling arrangements rather than 
disbursements for the financing of new exports. 
[For other notes on this tabulation, see notes to Table A at the end 
of this report.] 
In 1985, three-fourths of total imports to all developing 
countries came from the OECD (about US$ 300 billion). Of these 
imports, $42 billion (14&) were financed by disbursements of official 
aid from bilateral or multilateral agencies funded by the 17 DAC 
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member countries; $25 billion (9%) were financed by disbursements 
under officially supported medium and long-term export credits; and 
an estimated $53 billion (1835) were financed by disbursements under 
officially supported short-term (under one-year) export credits. 
Thus a total of 40% of all imports from OECD countries by all 
developing countries were officially supported in some form. 
As to the individual Caribbean countries, it is clear from the 
tabulation above that with regard to aid (other than export credits) 
as a source of finance for imports, the Bahamas and Trinidad receive 
only negligible amounts, Barbados only modest amounts, and Belize, 
Guyana and Jamaica major amounts. (In addition, among the OECS 
islands, as shown in Appendix Table 2, Grenada and Dominica are also 
highly dependent on aid flows). 
The estimates for officially supported export credits (total, 
column 4, above) appear to be highest for Jamaica and Trinidad (and 
above the average for all developing countries), the Bahamas and 
Belize are somewhat less than the average, Barbados is well below 
average, and Guyana is particularly small; these divergences are the 
result of conflicting motivations on the part of sellers in the OECD 
countries and the formulaters of creditworthiness standards for the 
export credit agencies. The highest demand for export credit 
insurance and guarantees is with respect to sales to countries or 
firms considered to be most risky, either in commercial risk terms or 
in terms of so-called political or sovereign risk (e.g., risk of 
default because of balance of payments problems). On the other hand, 
the export credit agencies try to spread their risks and thus to 
persuade their clients to insure sales to all of their customers or 
broad types of their customers. The clients, on the other hand, may 
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try to avoid, as unnecessary, the fees for insuring claims to good 
customers in countries where they perceive little or no political 
risk of default. On their part, the export credit agencies may 
charge more for insurance to riskier countries, may limit the amount 
of insurance exposure in particular countries, and may limit the 
length of terms they will issue, or insist in extreme cases on the 
use of only such instruments as confirmed irrevocable letters of 
credit before insuring. While the export credit agencies may try to 
treat as confidential the rules for particular countries, they 
obviously must communicate them as a practical matter to potential 
exporters to these countries. (Indeed, an informal appraisal of all 
developing countries is regularly made in the journal Trade 
Finance, which includes an evaluation of current country policies 
of the U.S. Exim Bank and the U.K. Export Credit Guarantee Department 
(ECGD); for a recent appraisal of Caribbean countries see [26]). 
Thus the high figure for Trinidad reflects a strong demand for 
continued insurance cover there on the part of exporters in OECD 
countries along with a continued willingness to provide such cover 
despite foreign exchange shortages, though some agencies may make a 
surcharge for coverage. The high figure for Jamaica may particularly 
reflect the effect of debt rescheduling exercises there, which take 
the form of providing new gross credits to offset payments due — so 
that actual new coverage may be far more limited, given the 
apparently tight rules and high surcharges which some export credit 
agencies are applying and given also the limitations on this type of 
credit which have no doubt been included in the rescheduling 
e x e r c i s e s . The relatively low figure for Barbados may reflect its 
high creditworthiness so that there may be only limited demand for 
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cover. The extremely low estimate for Guyana reflects the virtual 
suspension of most export credit insurance cover in the light of the 
debt servicing problems and the accumulated arrears of that country. 
C. The Operations of Export Credit and Insurance Agencies in the 
Developed Countries. (See references C113 to [22]). 
The above data, and related information, can also provide some 
benchmarks on the operations of export credit agencies in the 
developed countries which can throw light on the performance of 
similar institutions in the Caribbean region. 
Data on the operation of 19 export credit insurance or guarantee 
agencies in OECD countries for the 5-year period 1982 to 1986 (source 
[123 and [173) show that export credit agencies insured or guaranteed 
about U.S.$500 to $600 billion in exports or roughly 10% of their 
total exorts for the five-year period. 60 to 65% of insured exports 
went to developing countries, representing about 25% of all OECD 
exports to developing countries. During the five-year period, the 19 
agencies incurred losses totalling US$ 10.5 billion, or about 2% of 
total value insured — which can be viewed as a subsidy cost, 
originating from competitive pressures, which may have expanded the 
volume of exports and may have benefited buyers. However, most of 
the agencies professed to aim at making profits or breaking even on 
most of their insurance and guarantee services, and the losses 
reflect both rising claims and a declining trend in the value of 
insured exports (at least in part the result of declining exports 
from OECD to developing countries, which in turn may be largely 
attributable to the debt crisis in developing countries). 
The decline in global insured cover can be seen from the trend 
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in market penetration ratios (exports insured as X of total exports) 
for the 19 official insurance agencies, as follows: 
Market Penetration Ratio: 
(Insured exports as % of total) 
Country Agency 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Austria 0KB 40 30 30 27 23 
Japan EID, MITI 38. 4 30. 3 26. 5 24. 3 22. 9 
France CoFaee 33 34 24 25 23 
U.K. a) ECGD 32. 1 33. 9 29.6 25. 3 23. 3 
Denmark EKR 24.5 24.0 23.5 22. 0 23.0 
Spain CESCE 24.0 17, 3 11.8 12.0 11.4 
Portugal COSEC 17.0 15. 0 9.7 9.4 7.3 
Italy SACE 12. 3 7.7 7.8 6.7 4. 2 
Netherlands NCM 11.8 . 12.0 10. 8 9.8 11.4 
New Zealand EXGO 9.5 9. 5 9.9 10. 4 9. 3 
West Germany Hermes 9.2 7.7 6.6 5.8 4.8 
Finland VTL 8. 7 7.0 6.0 4. 2 4. 0 
Belgium OND 7.4 5.5 4.6 5.2 4.6 
Switzerland ERG 6.4 10.4 6.2 4. 7 3. 5 
Sweden EKN 6. 1 4. 4 3. 1 3.5 5.0 
Norway GIEK 3.2 3.5 2.4 5.5 5.0 
U. S. FCIA/Eximbank 3.0 3. 75 3. 1 3.3 2.0 
Canada EDC 2.2 3.5 2.0 2.0 2. 1 
a) % of U.K. non-oil exports. Source: [12] and [17]. 
While the declines in coverage over time within countries are 
impressive, the disparities between countries are even more so, 
obviously reflecting wide differences in the structure of exports and 
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in governmental policy as well as in the normal oommercial practioes 
for handling risks. 
Premium levels charged by the various sxport credit agencies can 
be crudely measured and compared by taking premium income in 1986 as 
a X of exports insured in 1966. The highest levels were Austria 
(4.05%), Sweden (3.30%), Switzerland (2.40%), West Germany (2.00%), 
and France (1.88%). Other major countries were U.K. (1.12%), Italy 
(1.08%), Netherlands and Belgium (0.80%), Canada (0.60%), Australia 
and U.S. (0.50%), and Japan (0.35%). Spain recorded the lowest level 
(0.15%). These are of course averages reflecting different mixes of 
exposure, different degrees of coverage, and different portfolios of 
country risks insured, so that they are at best only indicative of 
possible differences in premiums charged for the same coverage in the 
same area. 
With respect to the terms for officially supported medium and 
long-term export credits, 0ECD countries for years had sought to 
restrain the considerable competition which had grown up among 
exporting countries in subsidizing the sale of their capital goods 
exports. Finally, the "Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially 
Supported Export Credits, " also known as the 0ECD "Consensus, " came 
» 
into force in April 1978 among 22 member countries. It sets limits 
on the terms and conditions for export credits with a duration of two 
years or over and which are officially supported (i.e., "are given, 
subsidized, refinanced, guaranteed or insured by export credit 
agencies in the form of either supplier or buyer credits" [15, p.13). 
The agreement classifies recipient countries into three types: 
I. Relatively Rich Countries (mainly developed market economy 
countries); II. Intermediate Countries (includes most higher and 
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middle income developing countries); III. Rel&ttvely Poor 
Countries (includes IDA eligible developing countries). The main 
conditions are: 
1) At least 15% of the total Contract to be paid in cash; 
2) Maximum repayment term of 8.5 years, stretchable to 10 
years for relatively poor countries and some intermediate countries; 
3) Minimum rates of interest are specified for credits that 
are given official financing support (i.e., in the form of direct 
credit, refinancing, or interest rate subsidies) and are subject to 
change according to an automatic mechanism every half year. The 
interest rates in effect in both the first and second half of 1987 
were 
Country 2-5 Year 5-8.5 Year 8.5-10 Year 
Classification Credits Credits Credits 
Category I 
(relatively rich) 9.55 9.80 
Category II 
(intermediate) 8.25 8.75 
Category III (relatively poor) 7.40 7.40 7.40 
As an alternative to the above "matrix" rates, each participant 
may use its own "Commercial Interest Reference Rate" (CIRR) which 
reflects market interest rates in the particular exporting country. 
The CIRR rate ,is an accepted alternative particularly for participant 
countries which have normal market interest rates below the Consensus 
matrix rates (e.g., Switzerland). In general, however, for most 
participants, use of the Consensus matrix rates requires a subsidy as 
compared to their own market rates — a subsidy which is thus passed , 
on to the recipient borrowing country. (See [14], [15], [16], and 
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[11, PP. 231-285, for the complete text of the Consensus}). 
D. The Operations of Export Credit and Insurance Agencies in 
Developing Countries. (See references [23] to [253). 
In considering financing sources for the English-speaking 
Caribbean region which may have some possible subsidy element for 
imports, and in considering the nature of competition in credit terms 
which may face the region's exporters, attention needs to be paid not 
only to the export credit institutions of the developed countries but 
also to the growing number of such institutions in other developing 
countries. From both these points of view it is well to note that 
non-OECD export finance agencies charge typically somewhat lower 
interest rates than those in the Consensus. They also provide buyer 
credits, typically in US$ at fixed rates — and the rates are 
standard for all countries. They may also provide longer maturities 
(for example, Brazil provides one-year credits for consumer goods 
such as sewing machines). Finally, export credit cover has not been 
restricted to other developing countries in the way in which OECD 
agencies have cut back in the face of increasing claims and balance 
of payments problems (see [23]). (For a detailed description of the 
operations of export credit and insurance agencies in 32 countries, 
including 11 developing countries in Asia and Latin America, see 
[24]). 
E. The Operations of Export Credit and Insurance Agencies Serving 
English-Speaking Caribbean Countries. (See references [26]-[36]). 
Operations of agencies serving Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad & 
Tobago, and the OECS countries, as well as some region-wide 
institutions, are described below. 
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1. Central Bank of Barbados, Credit Insurance & Guarantees 
Department (CBB). 
The export credit insurance scheme began in 1978 in response to 
the development of the Caribbean Community (Caricom — originally 
Carifta). Local manufacturers wanted the economies of scale they 
c o u l d derive f r o m getting into the Caribbean market, but they didn't 
k n o w how t o get i n t o this wider market; they needed some sort of risk 
protection, i f not financing. For pre-shipment, CBB gives export 
financing guarantees and at post-shipment stage provides export 
credit insurance coverage. In 1981, an export rediscount facility 
for commercial bills on exports held by banks was created, using an 
Inter-American Development Bank line of credit of $1 million (now up 
to $2 million). Given the recent slump, the facility has not been 
f u l l y used, but CBB is seeking to use the line of credit more fully; 
CBB has been giving banks a 4% spread, but is considering shrinking 
this spread, and might change to permit direct discounting by the 
exporter at the facility. 
How have the schemes actually worked? The pre-shipment 
guarantee scheme started slowly; banks were reluctant to use it, and 
some complained about the 75% limit on the CBB's guarantee of 
commercial bank's on-lending to exporters (even though schemes in 
other countries often provide for only 66.7% coverage). When 
exporters began to have growing orders then the pressure built up and 
they increasingly used the facility; at the same time, the banks 
became a little careless in their monitoring, and in one or two cases 
firms drew funds they couldn't account for — and the CBB was slow to ' 
bail the banks out. If a commercial bank provides pre-shipment 
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credit and CBB provides a guarantee, if the exporter then makes the 
goods and sends them off and submits the necessary documents, and 
then say the overseas buyer rejects the goods (claiming they are 
defective), then there is no coverage under the pre-shipment 
guarantee scheme, since the rejection falls under the post-shipment 
part of the export cycle and is not eligible here. (Some security 
from the exporter would be needed to cover this additional risk.) In 
an actual case, CBB made a settlement on an ex grati& basis with 
a bank which had reimbursed an exporter for such a loss, since the 
bank had acted in good faith. In fact, the banks would like to have 
an unconditional post-shipment guarantee from CBB. 
As to the rediscount facility, it is for non-traditional exports 
— to promote newer exports. (Traditional exports, such as sugar and 
rum have their own special financing arrangements.) If for 90 days 
the buyer doesn't pay, CBB may charge the rediscounted export bill 
back to the bank, which may in turn charge it back to the exporter, 
but the due date may be extended 90 days and then for another 60 
days; however, if the exporter has an export credit insurance policy 
with CBB, there is an additional 4-month waiting period before CBB 
can act (though interest is charged on the overdue bill). 
Manufacturers often sell on a letter-of-credit cash basis and offer 
60 to 90 day terms which they must finance. CBB complains that 
exporters don't push hard enough to get payments on bills they have 
discounted. 
As to export credit insurance, this facility gives protection to 
exporters who don't know the Caricom market — it enables them to be 
agressive while still feeling protected. Coverage is 80% for 
commercial risk and 90% for political risk. Claims, which are 
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normally paid from fees received, had to be paid from capital 
reserves in 1985; CBB officials attribute this loss to the fact that: 
1) Fees were down as a result of the decline in exports to Trinidad; 
2) Claims arose because of the general decline in business fortunes, 
including difficult cash flow problems, the oil squeeze in Trinidad, 
t h e string of devaluations and problems of the scheduling of foreign 
e x c h a n g e payments in Jamaica (so that some businesses used this as an 
e x c u . s e for not paying). Despite this, CBB believes the scheme 
has- met its objectives; between 1980 and 1983 there was a 
significant jump in export values, in no small measure the result of 
credit insurance. Of all non-traditional exports, about 10-15% were 
covered in 1984; CBB research suggests that about 7-10% is the norm 
for such coverage in developing countries having insurance schemes. 
If you take out enclave exports, sugar and agriculture from total 
exports, then non-traditional exports remain. (Enclave exports are 
not eligible for insurance since they represent, inter-company 
transactions). In 1984 about $30 million was covered by the CBB 
scheme. The cessation of the Caricom Multilateral Clearing Facility 
(CMCF) also cut demand for export insurance, and this was accompanied 
by more trade restrictions, licenses, etc.; under CMCF Barbados was 
left holding some $68 million in inconvertible currencies. 
The comprehensive export credit insurance policy covers all 
exports of a particular firm -- exclusions are possible only by 
mutual consent, which may be agreed if the remaining portfolio 
represents an adequate spread of risks. CBB is thinking of 
introducing a deductible feature (as in health insurance) so that in 
the event of loss this part is borne by the exporter — in return for 
concessional rates for the insurance. In actual operating 
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experience, reading and knowing the policy is crucial, and failure 
leads to slip ups; CBB holds seminars to teach people to avoid doing 
things they shouldn't do; indeed, changes that don't qualify for 
coverage may b e overlooked for a time. 
One government official observed that at times there has been a 
reluctance on the part of the commercial banks to use the schemes for 
pre-shipment and post-shipment finance, particularly when the banks 
are liquid. The Central Bank scheme covers only 80%, leaving 
somewhat more than 20% exposure to the banks. Some have complained 
of high collateral requirements by the banks. So there is a certain 
conservatism, and the Central Bank has been conservative too 
(carefully checking out customers and delaying approvals). 
CBB is considering diversifying the type of insurance package 
available, and also the possibility of extending coverage to export 
of services. A consultant from India originally designed the 
Barbados scheme on lines similar to ECGD in the UK (although ECGD has 
dropped out of pre-shipment financing). 
The following tabulation summarizes the export credit activities 
of the CBB (source [29]): 
Value in B$ Million 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Total maximum liability outstand-
ing under the Export Credit 
Insurance & Guarantee Scheme 20. 2 31. 1 28. 2 21. 2 15.0 
Pre and post shipment finance 19. 6 20. 5 19. 4 10. 8 6.2 
of which: pre shipment 3.2 2.9 4. 3 4.0 
post shipment 16. 4 17. 6 15. 1 6. 8 
Export Rediscount Facility 
(bills discounted) 8.6 12. 3 9. 5 3.8 2.0 
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2. The National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica (Ex-Im). 
Jamaica Export Credit Insurance Corporation, the predecessor 
agency to Ex-Im, operated from 1971 to 1986, and is now being 
liquidated. The new Ex-Im Bank (which is 50% owned by the Central 
Bank) began operations on 1 May 1986. 
The export credit insurance offered by the National Ex-Im Bank 
of Jamaica includes a "comprehensive shipment policy" and a "service 
policy"; the latter covers Jamaican consultants or operators under 
U.S. section 807, who in effect export labor services to the U.S. — 
this is insurance against non-payment. Ex-Im is getting into new 
more difficult areas such as performance bonds and bid bonds (in late 
1986 they were setting up the legal documents, and already had the 
funds for the program). Ex-Im has government to government lines of 
credit in foreign exchange to draw down, including two lines of 
credit from the U.S. EXIM Bank and close contact with the ECGD in the 
U.K., as well as lines with private U.K. confirming houses and 
private banks; and Ex-Im is able to borrow at 1% above the U.S. prime 
rate. 
Ex-Im officials note that a borrower who comes into Ex-Im with a 
100% bank guarantee may still not get financed if he has too much 
credit outstanding. Ex-Im will also lend direct to end-users, 
bypassing commercial banks; for this Ex-Im requires an audited 
financial statement, a confirmed export order, credit checks on 
overseas banks, Dun and Bradstreet rating, and local borrowing 
record; Ex-Im makes an engineering, economic and financial analysis 
to assure that production and management capacity are present, and 
then the analysts make a recommendation to the Credit Committee if 
the amount sought is within approval limits (if not the case goes to 
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a sub-committee of the Board, or for higher limits to the Board). 
Ex-Im makes a risk rating, which is also relevant, and which is 
affected by whether a credit is to be unsecured or secured; category 
1 is the best, category 3 is marginal bordering good, and categories 
4 and 5 are for smaller lending, with stricter collateral. The 
viability of the project dominates, and category 1 and 2 can have 
some unsecured financing. A firm's track record counts heavily. 
S o m e l i n e s o f credit are for traders, s o m e for manufacturers for 
the local market, and some for manufacturers for export market. 
Ex-Im stresses flexibility, as evidenced in its new direct lending 
program; previously, business moved with 100% bank guarantees. At 
least firms under this program save the guarantee fee .— in the end 
Ex-Im is merely competitive. The Bank Import Guarantee program (BIG) 
is not now used, having been replaced by direct Ex-Im lending. 
Pre-shipment financing can be in local or foreign currency. A 
U.S.S pool has been provided from the World Bank to the Export 
Development Fund (EDF), managed by Ex-Im. The target is the 
non-traditional export sector (and agriculture too); the aim is to 
provide pre-shipment finance at terms up to one year for raw 
materials and light capital goods which must be imported. The local 
currency pre-shipment scheme permits a private bank to extend credit 
for local currency costs of future exports over and above the 
existing credit line of the bank to the firm, and enables the bank to 
discount the loan to Ex-Im. 
The Export Credit Facility (ECF) provides post-shipment working 
capital at an advantageous rate of interest through a discounting 
mechanism of commercial bank advances to exporters. All local 
finance (including the post-shipment discount facility) was being 
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provided by Ex-Im at 16% (late 1986) — Ex-Im considers this to be 
cheap money, subsidized from share capital equity, compared to 
private bank rates of 25-30% normally (and keeping in mind the 
inflation rate of 10-11%). The Bankers Export Guarantee Facility 
(BEGF) is also a post-shipment discounting scheme run by Ex-Im. 
In 1985 Ex-Im's Insurance Division insured about J$250 million 
- - a b o u t 20% of Jamaica's non-traditional exports (excluding bauxite 
and bananas). This is a high percent — overall market coverage in 
the U . S . is less than 5% — but if you use any facility of the Ex-Im 
Bank then you must insure as well. Coverage of Jamaica's exports t o 
the English-speaking Caribbean region is especially high — some 60%. 
The base rate for insurance is 70 to 75 cents per $100 of 
inventory value. Ex-Im used to have a rate schedule which varied by 
country and product, but now they have a composite rate, taking into 
account a particular exporter's business. Non-acceptance coverage is 
also available, but the percentage payment of loss is less (65%). 
Coverage otherwise is 70-75% and up to 80% or so. A cut rate is 
provided if there is a deductible in the policy. There is also a 
services policy for U.S. section 807 type operations, tour operators, 
data entry contractors, etc. 
The whole turnover is required to be covered by Ex-Im in 
Jamaica. [The U.S. EXIM has now started coverage by bloc (i.e., 
whole turnover for a division of an enterprise); for capital 
equipment, a single sale can be insured for medium term; if the whole 
book is covered, a lower rate is quoted; the U.S. also has a single 
buyer policy in the short term to help smaller exporters at a 
subsidized preferential rate]. In Jamaica there is interest in a 
catastrophic coverage, with a deductible; such coverage was started 
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in the U.S in 1965 by FCIA (now a part of EXIM) and by EDC in Canada 
— it is considered a very effective marketing tool. The Jamaicans 
would like to maintain a low premium to cover only heavy overdues and 
claims. On its part, Ex-Im in Jamaica has a reinsurance arrangement 
passing on a layer of risk to insurance companies. 
The following tabulation shows insured export sales by direction 
for Jamaica's Ex-Im Bank (and its predecessor): 
Value in J$ Million 
Country Exported to: 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986(a) 
Intra-Regional: 
Barbados 15. 9 18. 5 25. 2 51. 1 (40. 5) 
Trinidad & Tobago 73. 9 65. 4 81. 9 64. 0 (34. 9) 
Other Caricom 15. 8 16. 6 26. 8 43. 1 (49. 5) 
Extra-Regional: 
Canada 2. 4 2. 9 2. 4 6. 3 (8. 4) 
U.K. 16. 1 11. 8 8. 4 4. 8 (3. 9) 
U.S. 7. 5 10. 4 26. 7 46. 7 (55. St 
Other 18. 1 22. 9 25. 1 34. 0 (24. 9) 
Total 149. 7 168. 5 196. 5 250. 0 (213. 7) 
(a) Estimated by inflating the actual data for January-September 1986 
(i.e., multiplying by 1.33). 
Officials of the Jamaica Manufacturer's Association cite the 
high cost and the difficulty of accessing finance as major problems 
in expanding exports; for example, the Ex-Im Bank has stiff 
requirements, such as the necessity of commercial bank guarantees. 
Pre and post-shipment financing can't be gotten from the commercial 
banks. But to get concessional Ex-Im finance you need the backing of 
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a commercial bank — an 80% guarantee; commercial banks charge a fee 
for this. It would help if Ex-Im would be willing to accept other 
obligations as security, such as commitments from overseas buyers. 
I n d e e d , t h e s e Association officials feel that trade finance windows 
should be based on the viability of projects and on product 
p o t e n t i a l , and no collateral should be required — with the 
g o v e r n m e n t and the Central Bank sharing the risk. 
3. Trinidad & Tobago Export Development Corporation (EDC), (Export 
Credit Company of Trinidad & Tobago). 
Export credit insurance has been in operation in Trinidad since 
the late 1970s as a complement to export marketing efforts. The 
program originally lacked export credit financing. Recently EDC has 
developed a facility for discounting export paper, and has been 
looking toward further development of short-term pre and 
post-shipment guarantees using the commercial banks as the source of 
actual financing. The new post-shipment credit program of the EDC 
covers 85% of the value of shipments (and firms can use export 
development insurance as collateral); these credits carry high 
interest rates (11%), but lower than commercial banks (13% or so). 
EDC has also been working on extending coverage to services (such as 
consulting) and construction. Contract financing and performance 
bond guarantees have also been under consideration. All EDC 
facilities are available for both regional and extra-regional trade. 
EDC had also been hoping to organize direct pre- and post-
shipment financing in 1987, with commercial banks to act as agents 
for the Central Bank and with the Central Bank getting the funds from 
some aid source. (The Trinidad & .Tobago Manufacturer's Association 
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has urged that such finance be passed on to exporters without 
interest markups — and thus help achieve a higher priority for 
exports. ) 
4. The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), Export Credit 
Guarantee Scheme. 
The ECCB (located in St. Kitts) established an Export Credit 
Guarantee Scheme in July 1984 to assist exporters in getting more 
liberal finance from commercial banks in t h e OECS region at the 
pre-shipment stage, so as to be able to purchase, process, and 
manufacture goods to be exported against confirmed export orders. 
ECCB has noted (see [34], 1987 issue, p. 40) that only limited use 
has been made of the scheme. The ECCB therefore commissioned a study 
to evaluate and assess the scheme, and "several recommendations of 
the report have been approved for implementation." 
An official of the Council of Eastern Caribbean Manufacturers 
has noted that the commercial banks are not pushing the export credit 
guarantee scheme — since they earn a larger return without the 
Central Bank guarantee, they have high liquidity and don't need to 
stretch their resources, and there has been too much red tape and 
delay in using the scheme. Furthermore, there has been no guarantee 
covering post-shipment, so that there is no officially-supported 
insurance against lack of payment. 
5. Other Regional Export Credit Institutions 
The Latin American Export Bank (BLADEX), which was established 
in 1977, is a specialized multinational b a n k created to promote and 
finance the exports of Latin American and Caribbean member countries. 
Among its 22 member countries are three from t h e English-speaking 
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Caribbean region — Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago. 
Jamaica has benefitted particularly from this institution: its 
accumulated borrowings from 1979-1986 came to US$ 40.5 million, and 
its loan portfolio outstanding totalled US$ 2.1 million at the end of 
1986 (of which $0.9 million was short-term and $1.2 million medium 
term) (see [27] ). 
In July 1987, the heads of government of Caricom approved the 
creation of a new "Caribbean Export Bank," with the aim of providing 
pre- and post-shipment credit to regional exporters. Before starting 
operations later in 1988, efforts are being made to obtain some US$ 
50 million from international donors in support of the facility, to 
supplement the initial equity capital of US$ 17 million pledged by 
regional governments. 
F. The Banking System in the Caribbean Region. 
The various export credit agencies described in the previous 
section (E, above) are part of a wider network of banking 
institutions in the region affecting trade finance — commercial 
banks, merchant banks, development banks, and central banks. 
1. The Commercial Banks. 
For the region as a whole, the dominant feature of the 
commercial banking system is the very prominent role of branch 
offices or subsidiaries of major multinational banking institutions 
— particularly Canadian and British. For example, the B a n k of Nova 
Scotia is present in 11 of the 13 English-speaking Caribbean 
countries (the exceptions being Dominica and Montserrat); Barclays 
Bank is present in 10 of t h e countries (in all but Jamaica, Trinidad, 
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and Guyana); the Royal Bank of Canada is present in 9 countries (but 
not in Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana, and St. Vincent); and the Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce is present in 5 of the countries. Among 
U.S. banks, Chase Manhattan is present in the Bahamas and Barbados 
and Citibank in the Bahamas and Jamaica. There are some 
locally-owned private commercial banks (for example, in Antigua, 
Belize, Jamaica, St. Vincent and Trinidad) and some government owned 
commercial banks (for example, in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad). In 
Guyana, the only foreign banks now operating in the country are the 
Bank of Nova Scotia and the Bank of Baroda; the government acquired 
the local operation of Barclays Bank in November 1987 (for the 
nominal price of one Guyana dollar); Chase Manhattan had withdrawn in 
a similar manner in 1985, as had the Royal Bank of Canada a year 
earlier — withdrawals that took place because of difficulties in 
operating and in repatriating earnings, given the extreme foreign 
exchange stringency facing Guyana, so that the private banks were 
operating essentially only as collection agencies. In contrast, 
Barbados and the Bahamas each continue to have a half-dozen or more 
different multinational commercial banks operating. 
Generally, the commercial banks in most of the region have 
recently been highly liquid, which has meant relatively low interest 
rates for depositors; at the same time, lending rates to borrowers 
have remained high — and the spread between the two rates has grown. 
For example, in Antigua this spread grew from about 7% in 1983 and 
1984 to 11% in 1986. In the Bahamas, in 1980, the average spread 
between cost of funds to the commercial banks and the cost to their 
borrowers was about 6% — and had grown to 10% in 1986; there is 
concern about rates and the fact that credit is hard to get. Even 
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though in the Bahamas there are 9 different multinational commercial 
banks in the Clearing Bank Association, they are thought to operate 
in effect as a cartel, and some government officials hope that the 
arrival of new more aggressive banks will inject competition into a 
highly uncompetitive system -- particularly in short-term trade 
credit. 
Business officials in Antigua have pointed out that the OECS 
countries are totally dependent on commercial banks, which are not 
equipped or trained for manufacturing industry, but rather are still 
geared to commercial credit. There is more risk in industry, and the 
lack of competition means the banks are able to command more security 
-- almost on a 3 to 1 ratio. At the same time there is no local 
development bank available as an alternative. In the OECS countries 
the local branches of international banking corporations do not 
normally lend locally more than they generate locally. Well 
established firms get overdraft and revolving credit facilities for 
normal working capital; however, an attempt, by one such firm in 
Antigua to get financing from a bank for an expansion of plant was 
delayed for more than a year before approval and was then at such a 
high interest cost that the firm could not undertake it. Financing 
difficulties need to be seen as one factor in the competitiveness of 
OECS exporters. Overall, the shortcomings in their ability to export 
include these factors: 1) There is a lack of finance at development 
rates of interest for buildings, equipment, and raw materials (and 
commercial finance itself is very high compared to conditions in 
Japan and the U.S.); 2) Though labor costs are relatively low, 
freight costs are relatively high; 3) Raw materials need to be 
stockpiled for 2 to 3 months (compared to as little as 2 days or a 
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week elsewhere), since there may be a sailing only once a month for, 
say, Antigua; and a 2 to 3 month inventory has to be financed at 
commercial banks at commercial rates; 4) Tax concessions are 
relatively generous and geared to exports and earning hard currency 
but the benefits of tax concessions can be offset by, for example, 
h i g h electricity costs.: 5) Tt is difficult to negotiate with local 
b a n k s f o r any unusual finance (such as plant expansion) when real 
d e c i s i o n questions are passed on to headquarters, say, in Barbados or 
L o n d o n , and an exporter can't go over the head of the local agent- of 
the bank to make a case for his project before the real 
decision-maker. 
A basic trade problem in the OECS countries is the small scale 
and weakness of local business -- these are small businessmen; 
they need working capital, financing of capital assets, and technical 
assistance. Lacking these, many firms get orders that they cannot 
supply. An in-depth study of 20 companies in the OECS region shows 
that: 40% are technically bankrupt, but are allowed to trade by 
their banks; 40% are roughly at the break-even point; and only 20% 
are really commercially viable. Discounting of bills (which is done 
as a matter of course by the commercial banks) is a major source of 
financing; all costs come to 16 to 18% — but businesses are not 
really bothered by these ratesif they get their money quickly. The 
commercial banks are thus dominant in the face of small scale firms 
and extremefinancial weakness. 
In Jamaica, an official of the Manufacturers Association pointed 
out that there has been an asymmetry between importing and exporting: 
A businessman can go to his commercial bank and overdraft for 
imports; the problem is exports, where he faces a 100% collateral 
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requirement to get a guarantee, and where he is exposed to foreign 
exchange risk in the event of devaluation, (but does not benefit from 
the gains from any revaluation). A Jamaican bank official noted that 
there is a foreign exchange shortage, but some lines of credit are 
not u s e d , since lenders don't want the risk; everything is on a cash 
b a s i s or sight, and there is a rush to get to the foreign exchange 
a u c t i o n early; the last 6 or 7 years have been dominated by short 
term investment -- almost no long term -- basically reflecting lack 
of confidence in the system. 
2. Merchant- Banks. 
There are merchant banks with an active role in trade finance in 
Trinidad & Tobago and in Jamaica: 
(a) The International Industrial Merchant Bank of Trinidad & 
Tobago (IIMB) operates like a private institution, although its 
parent company is governmentally owned. Started in August 1982, and 
originally owned by Pariba, the National Commercial Bank of Trinidad 
& Tobago bought it out in July 1983. IIMB has since been doing very 
well, having earned a profit of TT$ 4 million in the year ending in 
June 1.986; as the only merchant bank in Trinidad, it is able to 
operate more flexibly than the commercial banks. In the field of 
trade, it provides import credit lines, picks up letters of credit, 
and also has clients who import on open account. IIMB avoids 
construction or land development, and favors trading, agriculture and 
manufacturing; it is involved in consortium loans with other banks. 
IIMB does not do very much export trade finance — it provides 30 and 
60 day credit terms, and looks at t h e strength of the foreign buyer 
and the local business. As to credits longer than one year, import 
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credit lines can revolve. While commercial banks will go as long as 
10 years, I1MB will do some 5 to 10 year loans, but with more at 15 
years — and will tend to use floating rates; the late 1986 prime 
rate was 11.5%, and was marked up by 3% at most and by as little as 
0.5%. (The prime had been 13% two years earlier.) As to supplier 
credits, ECGD provides lines to Trinidad importers, and the Italians, 
for example, offer attractive rates. I1MB is looking at the 
possibility of facilitating hedging against foreign exchange risks; 
(devaluation insurance is available internationally from Montague and 
other firms, but i.t is now very expensive). ' 
(b) In Jamaica, the Eagle Merchant Bank carries out its foreign 
trade operations primarily through its subsidiary, Eagle Trade 
Services Limited, which, in the case of exports to the U.S. and 
Canada, has worked primarily through the U.S.-based factoring firm of 
Rosenthal & Rosenthal to factor .Jamaican exports — a business 
amounting to from U.S.$ 5-20 million per year. Goods have moved only 
slowly. One non-traditional export -- garments and linked products 
under the U.S. 807 program has also been slow. Of course the 
factoring company deals with a range of importers, not just 1 or 2. 
Eagle uses the export credit insurance facilities of the Jamaican 
Ex-Im Bank, which provides an 80% advance on export proceeds, and it 
discounts letters of credit. On the import side, a related company 
in Miami, Eagle Trade Finance Corporation, acts as a confirming house 
— but there is a limit on the confirming of letters of credit issued 
by Eagle in Jamaica. An Eagle official believes it would be very 
useful to have some large facility in the region, say the Caribbean 
Development Bank, to act as a confirming house — to use its strength 
to confirm letters of credit without any such limits, and CDB would 
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have to put out little money to do this. Eagle finances local 
currency to go into the Jamaica foreign currency auction system, and 
there is little credit risk; and they are able to cover the foreign 
exchange risk a few months forward; (it takes a few weeks to clear 
the foreign exchange auction in Jamaica). As to regional trade, 
Eagle handles hard currency trading only. (An Eagle official thinks 
it might be interesting to try to set up a reverse factoring system, 
covering exports into Jamaica and other Caricom places — but doubts 
the momentum is there for such a scheme). Eagle also manages the 
Falcon Fund, the first venture capital fund to be organized in 
partnership with the World Bank's subsidiary, the IFC; [investments 
will be made in quasi-equity form in Jamaican productive 
enterprises.] 
(c) One Jamaican banker thought that the potential benefits of 
merchant banking could not all be realized in the single countries of 
the region, but that maybe a West Indies Merchant Bank operating in a 
larger pool could spread risks, and thus have a chance of success — 
but it would need external backing, and not only soft money but 
grants, so that if it lost, it lost, without imposing a drain on 
resources of the region to repay such losses. 
3. Development Banking. 
The following are selected examples of development banking 
operations in the region: 
(a) The Central Bank of Barbados (CBB), administers a B$ 25 
million Industrial Credit Fund (ICF), with B$ 21 million borrowed 
from the World Bank (term, 15 years; interest rate in late 1986 about 
8.5 %), and with the balance a Central Bank counterpart of B$ 4 
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million. ICF provides credits through financial intermediaries to 
persons in productive enterprises in tourism, manufacturing, 
fisheries, agriculture, mining and quarrying, and supporting services 
(but not distribution). Loans provided are medium and long term, 7 
years up to 15 years, including grace period up to 3 years. The 
entire capital of B$ 25 million is a grant to ICF, with the 
government servicing the World Bank loan. The financial 
intermediaries used are 7 commercial banks and the Barbados 
Development Bank, as well as the Caribbean Financial Services Corp. 
(a private quasi-bank). ICF provides up to 90% (and this is usual) 
of the total amount to be lent to the end-user; terms to the 
intermediary are 2% below the weighted average prime rate — so that 
lending in late 1986 was at 6.3% (prime 8.3%). The credit risk is 
with the banks, which have a free hand on the terms to end-users; the 
spread on the 90% ICF financing can be as low as 1%, while interest 
on the 10% input from the banks may be 1% higher. Funds have gone 
mainly for fixed assets, though their is some provision for technical 
assistance and working capital. World Bank disbursement guidelines 
have to be followed, so that banks cannot finance paper more than 90 
days old — and therefore applications for financing have to go to 
the World Bank 90 to 180 days prior to intended shipment date. The 
ICF needs to know that a project is developmental before approval, so 
that there is scrutiny of both IRR and ERR (internal and external 
rates of return — shadow prices), and the impact on employment, 
foreign exchange, and output. The Barbados Development Bank has been 
the biggest channel for funds. B $ 17.2 million have been committed 
by ICF in its first 3 years — B$ 11.9 million in 1984; B$ 1.3 
million in 1985; B$ 3.9 million in 1986. Cumulative disbursements 
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totalled B$ 13.1 million by the end of 1986. The banking system in 
Barbados has been very liquid and therefore this has reduced the 
incentive to tap ICF funds; projects have suffered by being forced to 
shorter terms, using the banking systems own funds ([29] and [33]). 
(b) The Bahamas Development Bank (BDB) hopes to broaden the 
industrial base, and to encourage joint ventures between locals and 
foreigners. The Bahamas does observe the Caricom harmonized incentive 
rules for attracting foreign ventures (but does not adhere to the 
common market — instead, they are observers in Caricom). Overall, 
the BDB has obtained its funding from a variety of sources: $6 
million from the Caribbean Development Bank (10 years at 7.5%); 
$900,000 from the European Economic Fund (15-20 years at 1.5%); $3 
million from the Inter-American Development Bank (for fishing) (10 
years at 7.5%); $3 million borrowed from the National Insurance Fund 
of the Bahamas at commercial rates; and $3 million from the Central 
Bank of the Bahamas. (The National Insurance has provided $500,000 
for small fishing boats at 7.5% interest; otherwise its funds are at 
11-12.5%). The average cost of BDB funds is about 9%, compared to 
12.5, 13, or 14% from commercial banks. BDB provides grace periods 
on its loans: 30 days for a quick start up project; 6-9 months for 
most other projects, although construction would get 1 to 1.5 years. 
As to length of maturity, agricultural projects are flexible and they 
try to take account of the seasonality of fishing, but the average 
maturity is 5.5 years; a big fishing boat might be 7.5 years and a 
construction project 10 years. However, working capital for all 
I 
projects is expected to come from the commercial banks. The BDB has 
been in operation for 9 years. 
Some executives in business, banking, and government have 
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criticized the BDB — for using unreal guidelines for its activities, 
for demanding too much collateral of its borrowers while providing 
them with too little funding, and for extreme delays in processing 
applications. There is a lack of skilled manpower — so that more 
training is needed. There is some talk of using more National 
Insurance funds to expand the capital of the BDB. But until there is 
a stronger sense of what type of projects to emphasize and until it 
can begin to lend in adequate amounts at less than commercial rates, 
and to take calculated risks for important development objectives, 
these observers feel that BDB is not yet a true development bank. 
(c) In Jamaica, the National Development Bank (NDB) and the 
Agricultural Credit Bank (ACB) were established in 1981 to replace 
the old Jamaica Development Bank. The NDB, which is more than 6 
years old now, has $15 million in Inter-American Development Bank 
money for on-lending at 5-10 year terms — but through the commercial 
banks, with 100% commercial bank guarantees. Officials of the 
Manufacturer's and of the Exporter's Associations and some bankers 
have complained that Jamaica now lacks true development banking; for 
example, the NDB portfolio has moved slowly since they are 
effectively negotiating commercial rather than development loans 
— and you cannot get real export expansion without a proper 
development bank. These officials point out that the old Jamaica 
Development Bank made project evaluations, lent direct to end users, 
self-collateralized the projects, and was development oriented — and 
yet there was less than a 2% default in its portfolio when it ended 
up (based on 1979-80 status); thus, direct lending without guarantees 
has worked in the past in the region. The Trafalgar Bank, a 
privately-owned institution set up in 1985 with $20 million in U.S. 
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AID funds, was aimed to be a development bank, but the Association 
officials claim that it too has absorbed a commercial bank 
philosophy, and U.S. AID has sought J$ exchange rate guarantees by 
the Jamaican government. Businessmen and bankers believe there are 
enough development banking resources to meet Jamaicas needs if they 
ould be directly and effectively tapped by the private sector; risk 
taking is needed on new export proposals — and venture capital 
should be forthcoming for good projects quite apart from ordinary 
commercial credit limits which may already be fully tied up. 
) In Trinidad and Tobago, a government agency, che Dev.. .pment 
Finance Corporation (DFC), supports development efforts with loans of 
up to a maximum of TT$ 10 million on any project. (An official of 
the Manufacturers Association in Trinidad believes there is a need 
for 15 year loans and a restructuring of the DFC, in the face of a 
real shortage of long-term capital — as can be seen from the sharp 
rise in short-term borrowing). 
Investment finance is often the bottleneck to new foreign 
venture projects in Trinidad seeking to benefit from tax free 
concessions (10-year relief, in two 5-year tranches, from withholding 
tax on equity investment). The Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) needs to be satisfied that there is a foreign exchange margin 
on export (or import substitution) projects. IDC can make available 
concessional loans (of up to TT$ 250,000) for appropriate small 
projects at 3.5 to 7 % interest. IDC rules provide some 3 years 
before any take-out of foreign capital can occur. 
7 
(e) In the 0ECS region, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
(ECCB) has administered, since 1984, the Infrastructure fc-
Productive Investment Project (IPIP), with funding of US$ 12 million 
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from U.S. AID. The project was intended "to provide commercial banks 
access to long-term funds to finance commercial loans to private 
sector developers of industrial properties . . . [and thus to meet] 
perceived demand for industrial estates facilities in the OECS 
States." ([34], 1985 issue, p.30). US$ 10 million in loan funds were 
supposed to finance private developers of industrial estates, while 
US$ 2 million was reserved to finance owner-occupied projects. 
During 1986, loans amounting to US$ 1 million were approved for new 
owner-occupied projects in Grenada, Antigua, and St. Kitts. This was 
expected to bring total disbursements of US$ 2 million by the 
projects original completion date of September 30, 1987, with the 
bulk of the funds unutilized. ([34], 1987 issue, p. 40). 
In Antigua, an official of the Manufacturers Association 
indicated that firms and investors have been reluctant to use IPIP 
because they have to bear the foreign exchange risk (which he feels 
the Central Bank should take for development purposes) and because of 
the high rates of interest; concessional funds come from the ECCB to 
the commercial banks at about 3% and are marked up by 5% or so and 
are on-lent to users at 9%; so, the investors are expected to bear 
the foreign exchange risk and to put up super collateral as well — 
and this is why the IPIP scheme has not worked. (The commercial 
banks, on their part, have been reluctant to take the foreign 
exchange risk, but still have wanted their full interest rate spread 
in handling such loans. 
(f) As to region-wide institutions, The Caribbean Development 
Bank (CDB) has been in operation since 1970, having provided $555.6 
million in net loans to the region from 1970 through 1985 — with the 
largest recipients being Jamaica (21%)', Barbados (9%); St. Lucia, 
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Guyana and Belize (8% each); and regional projects (1085). More 
recently, in 1985 alone $33.1 million were disbursed by CDB, with the 
largest recipients being Jamaica (29%); St. Lucia (12%); St. Vincent 
(7%); St. Kitts and Grenada (5%); and regional projects (19%). 
4. The Central Banks and the Exchange Control System. 
The Central Banks of the region play a varying but significant 
role in trade finance by regulating the banking system and 
administering exchange controls, 
(a) In Guyana, while import licenses are issued by the Ministry 
of Trade, foreign currency has to be sought from the central bank, 
the Bank of Guyana. The external payments deposit scheme, in 
operation since 1978, calls on private parties and at least some 
state trading companies to deposit local currency in advance with 
commercial banks for imports of both commodities and services. On 
receipt of documents, a 30 day sight letter of creedit is issued by 
the commercial bank; interest is paid on the local currency deposits. 
The government split the cost of devaluation in the early 1980s with 
the depositor. Since 1983 under scheme II the importer bears the 
entire exchange risk. The availability of import licenses depends on 
budget allocations and ad hoc arrangements and, as of late 1986, was 
still very much a matter of luck and timing, and a problem for 
bankers. An official of the Chamber of Commerce suggested that 
foreign sellers might be provided with a lien on Guyanan export 
earnings as a possible way of easing some of the acute current 
payments difficulties, created by the build-up of arrears on debt; he 
noted also that the government was proposing to attract n e w industry 
with incentives, such as higher than the usual (i.e., 15 to 30%) 
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retention of foreign exchange earnings; he felt that new incentives 
of this type should also be extended to existing enterprises. 
(b) The Central Bank of Trinidad &. Tobago has tried to make it 
easy to discount export bills, and officials there have argued that 
financing is generally adequate in manufacturing and trade, and that 
new lines of credit from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
and the Latin American Export Bank (BLADEX) will help exporters in 
Trinidad meet the competition (who already have access to similar 
credits); to help the Trinidad export industry with imports, the 
government has signed an agreement with ECGD in the U.K., providing 
guarantees on the import side. However, the taking on of supplier 
credit or similar foreign source financing by Trinidad enterprises 
needs government financial approval; but private firms often 
negotiate foreign loans on their own and come in for approval at the 
last minute when the loan is a fait accomplis — which can make 
it difficult for the Central Bank to determine its private sector 
external debt precisely. Central Bank approval is needed to set up a 
new industrial investment in Trinidad (to assure foreign exchange for 
required imports); on the other hand, the government was not, as of 
late 1986, giving any guarantees to private investors regarding 
exchange risk. 
In October 1983, the government (through the Central Bank and 
the Ministry of Commerce) introduced an elaborate system of exchange 
controls, which limits certain kinds of imports, and with 
restrictions on both residents and non-residents; t h e system has been 
more loosely enforced vis a vis Caricom countries. The controls aim 
to isolate the capital market so that assets or liabilities outside 
Trinidad cannot be acquired without exchange control approval; again 
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the rules have been easier for assets or liabilities in Caricom 
countries. Business leaders have complained about delays and 
bureaucracy in the exchange control licensing system, with import or 
export transactions apparently potentially involving 55 forms; they 
argue for reduction in delays and paper work, and that if there are 
cuts in availabilities, these should be allocated proportionally. 
The basic form EC-0 is for exchange authorization; the form EC-1 is 
to get actual payment. One annoyance is that people have to go to 
the Central Bank to get approval, not only for equipment, but even 
for royalty payments. (A Chamber of Commerce official suggested that 
foreign currency accounts should be made freely useable by 
entrepreneurs, with the aim of legitimizing foreign deposits. The 
EC-1 forms should be used only for invisible transactions. It was 
also pointed out that with the EC-0 system, firms cannot hedge.) 
(c) The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) services the seven 
OECS countries (an eighth country, Anguilla, is being added as a 
member). Normal central bank 
powers are split between ECCB and the 
individual member countries — foreign exchange controls and 
licensing lies with the individual countries, while the ECCB sets 
reserve requirements for the banks and also sets interest rates on 
all bank savings accounts (set at a minimum of 4% as of late 1986). 
The ECS is backed by 60% of U.S. dollar investments; (thus if 
investments of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank in U.S.S come to 
400 million, then they can print up to a total of ECS 667 million). 
Foreign exchange in the Eastern Caribbean region comes mainly from 
the tourist industry; if U.S.$ reserves fall below 60%, the central 
bank must take ECS off the market or experience devaluation; so the 
central bank authorities are concerned about what foreign 
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currencies the ECCB holds. (EC$ 2.70 to US$ 1.00 has been fixed 
since 1978). 
In Antigua, there are no currency restrictions or controls. 
Hard currency earned does not get into the banking system. The 
Minister of Finance in Antigua approves US$ transactions for local 
and expatriate firms (e.g., Maidenform). 
(d) In the Bahamas, state banking is a monopoly. (All 
commercial banks have foreign status.) The Central Bank of the 
Bahamas sets an interest rate band, and the commercial banks respond 
slowly; the prime rate was down to 9% in late 1986. 
In regard to the U.S., there is no balance of payments problem. 
Access directly to supplier credits in the U.S. is useful; 
merchandising companies can call and get a note by phone. New 
companies have come into the Bahamas with good credit lines to 
Florida banks (such as the Sun Bank), and they get started with an 
irrevocable letter of credit from these sources. On the whole there 
is reasonably easy access to foreign exchange. 
As to manufacvring, the Bahamas is a high cost economy, quality 
controls are often lacking, and prices are not competitive. Basic 
incentives were laid down in the Industries Encouragement Act of 
1970. But there is a dilemma between the government's tax haven 
policy on the one hand and the fact that the government's revenue tax 
base is dominated by taxes on imports, while at the same time local 
manufacturers are vigorously urging protection. The average import 
duty on consumer goods had reached 33% in 1986 — up 2% across the 
board in 1984. 
As to controls on capital account, there is an investment dollar 
market operated by the Roy West Trust on behalf of t h e Government of 
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the Bahamas; unlike the current account, in which t h e Bahamian dollar 
trades at . p a r with the U.S. dollar, the small investment dollar 
market requires a premium of about 20% if Bahamian residents wish to 
i n v e s t a b r o a d . There is also a limit o f $5,000 for travel abroad and 
$ 6 , 0 0 0 f o r education. (Ordinary exchange controls are administered 
b y t h e c o m m e r c i a l banks on behalf o f the government). 
(e) In Jamaica, the central bank (The Bank of Jamaica) runs the 
auction system — the foreign exchange system which has been in 
operation since 1984. It is a sort of Dutch auction, held twice 
weekly (on Tuesday and Thursday). Foreign exchange accrues each half 
week, and certain amounts are set aside for official debt service 
payments, fuel imports, and some other official obligations, with the 
balance being supplied to the market; demand at the auction comes 
from commercial banks (and individuals with over J $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ) requiring 
conversion to foreign exchange. The government announces the amount 
of foreign exchange available on the day prior to the auction. The 
clearing rate is the lowest bid received. 
Before the auction, there had been a unification of rates in 
November 1983 and a devaluation; prior to that there had been 
multiple rates — a Caricom rate, an official rate, and a market (or 
parallel) rate. A lot of bureaucratic controls have gone as a result 
of the simplification. Import licenses are required for some goods; 
there is some worry about over-invoicing and similar practices, and 
here the customs system comes in -- where a Swiss based corporation 
was hired to check for violations, causing delays which the private 
sector says affects production (and there have been threats of law 
suits); the matter was being examined by the government in late 1986. 
However, before the auction system, an importer would have to apply 
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to the Trade Board for an import license, and then to Exchange 
Control for a check of documents and to get an allocation of foreign 
exchange -- and there were huge delays, which have since been wiped 
out. 
Since the end of 1985, the auction rate has been very stable, 
fluctuating between 5.48 and 5.51; in 1985, there had been huge 
fluctuations, creating internal uncertainties and having an impact on 
inflation. Since then, there have been efforts to assure the supply 
of foreign exchange, and improvements in the stability of inflows; 
the black market was reduced to quite an extent, so that there was 
little difference between the two rates; also, improvements in the 
tourist sector have led to an increase in the inflow of foreign 
exchange, and it has been chanelled into the banking system. 
Central bank officials indicated that the IMF program, and its 
seal of approval, has been necessary for the cooperation of other 
creditors, and adjustments to the economy have proceeded accordingly. 
An official of the Exporters Association noted that on average 
the import content of exports for Jamaica is about 21% — so he 
suggested that 30 cents per dollar of export earnings ought to be 
retained by the exporter as foreign exchange for his use in 
importing; this would overcome one important part of the foreign risk 
situation, giving surer access to the import market, and assuring 
availability of resources and the rate of exchange for imports. 
Holders of such foreign exchange would still need approvals through 
the central bank for its use, but such funds would get out of the 
commercial banks, which in his view have no real commitment to 
development. 
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G. Strengthening Indigenous Export Potent ia l : Problems of 
Undercapital izat ion, Management, and Entrepreneurship. 
There i s considerable i n t e r e s t in the region in ways t o 
strengthen exporters . Barbadan o f f i c i a l s have noted that there has 
been an undercap i ta l i zat ion of industr ies in general ; the premise of 
f i s c a l incent ives has been f o r the entrepreneur to keep p r o f i t s 
rather than get grants; there is the feeling that owner-managers have 
been prone t o siphon o f f the earnings from the good times into 
expensive cars and large houses rather than in to strengthening the 
c a p i t a l and reserves of t h e i r businesses. I f indigenous 
manufacturing firms were f i n a n c i a l l y strong they could s t o c k p i l e 
output during slumps, but most of them are f i n a n c i a l l y weak. What i s 
needed, they f e e l , i s a re f inanc ing of ex i s t ing companies on a 
s e l e c t i v e bas is — f inancing them generously. There should be quick 
pre-shipment f inancing f o r substant ia l orders, Furthermore, new 
schemes should not be favored — but rather get e x i s t i n g schemes t o 
work more e f f i c i e n t l y . The Barbados Development Bank should take the 
lead in such ref inancing and should at the same time provide serv i ces 
t o management t o help so lve ex i s t ing problems which impede 
e f f i c i e n c y ; in some cases t h i s should involve d i r e c t management help 
or even supervis ion. Where management is at l eas t minimally 
competent, then management consultants might be used f o r a period of 
years t o improve the e f f i c i e n c y of firms. These o f f i c i a l s note that 
there are a few management consultants in Barbados, and a s i zeab le 
pool in the Caribbean region. They f e e l that there should be weekly 
monitoring of managemant, and accounts should be looked at on a 
monthly bas i s — otherwise when cash f low improves owner-managers 
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might be naively tempted to make withdrawals for their personal use, 
with possibly catastrophic.- consequences f o r solvency la ter . [The 
intrusion which t h i s proposal en ta i l s into the owner-manager's 
decision-making province would probably be resented in such very 
small enterprises , and may not be at a l l consistent with the o f ten 
dominant motivation of independent small entrepreneurs — avoidance 
of the loss of control]. 
As to f inancing to s tart new ventures aimed at export markets, 
Barbadan o f f i c i a l s noted that ava i lab le money i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y 
s o f t t o a t t rac t the r e a l l y best source of new entrepreneurs — 
namely, the large pool of able management personnel already working 
on the island, most of whom already have good jobs ; these potent ia l 
founders of new ventures simply cannot a f f o r d t o mortgage the i r 
houses, deplete a l l the i r savings, and g ive up the i r present 
well -paid jobs in order t o t ry out some of the i r new ideas — there 
i s simply too much r isk of losing everything. What i s needed, the 
o f f i c i a l s f e e l , i s a program t o tap th i s source of entrepreneurship 
by reducing these personal r i sks , f inanced part ly by grant funds, and 
made avai lable f o r c a r e f u l l y chosen export p r o j e c t s and c a r e f u l l y 
chosen people, aimed at s e l l i n g in the extra-regional market. (In 
Ireland, which has experimented with schemes of th i s kind, there are 
always new companies opening). There is not a good manufacturing, 
base in Barbados because the indigenous firms are so weak. With a 
scheme for supporting and nurturing new indigenous entrepreneurs, 
they f e e l that even i f there i s a high f a i l u r e rate, there w i l l be 
some employment b e n e f i t s — and some successes. 
An OECS o f f i c i a l elaborated on how such a scheme (based on the 
idea of "incubation u n i t s , " which has been t r i e d in Ireland) might 
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work: There might be 3 groups of 20 persons each, to develop and 
research their individual ideas; they would be expected to critically 
evaluate each other ' s p r o j e c t proposals ; a f t e r 3 or 4 months each 
would-be entrepreneur would be given space and up t o $10,000 r i sk 
cap i ta l on a concessional bas is , the use of which he would have t o 
defend before a board; the f l e d g l i n g entrepreneurs would have common 
services. and low initial rent, and they would eventua11v be pushed 
out of the nest; (in Ireland, out of 1,000 enrolees, 480 units were 
launched, employing an average o f 2 .9 persons per enterpr i se ) . 
[In Guyana, special help i s provided f o r "micro-entrepreneurs" — 
those with investments of $5,000 and under; they t y p i c a l l y lack 
c o l l a t e r a l and tradit ional commercial banks will not provide credits 
f o r imports, so that more unorthodox methods are used: c r e d i t i s 
provided by GUYAMIDA if the entrepreneur can show a letter from a 
f o re ign buyer guaranteeing to purchase a certain amount of exports, 
and repayments can be made on an installment basis . (India has a 
s imi lar scheme).] 
H. Raising the Pr i o r i ty of Exports. 
As economic policy has evolved in the newly independent English-
speaking Caribbean states over the past two decades, there has been a 
s h i f t i n g balance between inward and outward-looking p o l i c i e s , i . e . , 
between (1) the encouragement of l o ca l enterprises for the local 
market through such devices as p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f s , negative l i s t i n g s , 
tax concessions, and exchange rate p o l i c y , and (2) the ac t ive support 
o f export expansion through incent ives and subsidies such as tax 
hol idays , low-cost factory rentals , p r i o r i t y access t o fore ign 
exchange, and concessional f inance. While t o a certain extent these 
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two policy aims can support each other (for example, in that 
newly-encouraged firms t o serve the internal market can in theory 
eventually be expanded t o become exporters ) , more general ly over time 
the p o l i c i e s c o n f l i c t , so that where they are pract iced s i d e - b y - s i d e 
(as in much of the Caribbean region) a good deal of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s 
of export promotion e f f o r t s can be o f f s e t by internal ly oriented 
measures which reduce the ability of exporters to compete effective]?'' 
in international markets. [There were, f o r example, over 400 items 
on the negative l i s t in Trinidad in late 1986 — as an industr ial 
p o l i c y device . Indeed, the import content o f manufacturing exports 
from Trinidad averaged 45% in 1986; i t had been some 50% be fore 1981, 
when the government imposed requirements f o r loca l o r i g i n . ] 
Economists have attempted to measure the extent of any overal l 
p o l i c y bias against exports by estimating the r e la t i ve degree of 
e f f e c t i v e pro tec t i on of production f o r the domestic market as against 
production f o r export, taking into account the re la t ive impact on 
domestic and export production of a l l taxes, t a r i f f s , and subsidies 
( including the hidden costs of bureaucratic procedures and de lays ) . 
The results of these studies suggest such a bias i s a problem in many 
countries of the region. (See [78] and [79] , inter a l i a . ) Po l i cy 
makers f o r each country, and reg ional ly , need t o consider ways t o 
s h i f t the r e l a t i v e degree of e f f e c t i v e protect ion toward exports, and 
away from home market bias. They need t o consider whether the 
present p r i o r i t y f o r exporting is adequate, and what p o s i t i v e e f f o r t s 
can be undertaken to make exporting more a t t r a c t i v e in general, and 
r e l a t i v e t o domestic production. 
Exchange contro l i s an area where improvements in p r i o r i t y f o r 
exports should be r e l a t i v e l y easy to make. Exchange contro l systems 
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in the region (as long as they remain necessary) need t o be made l e s s 
arbitrary, less expensive, and less time consuming, e s p e c i a l l y f o r 
exporters — in part i cu lar , making sure that the import content o f 
exports i s given p r i o r i t y over other imports. Complaints on t h i s 
score have been widespread, and the exchange contro l system in one 
country was characterized as "MAD" ( f o r "Maximum Administrative 
Delay"), and was accompanied by great inconsistency and uncertainty 
as to actual government policy. It seems reasonable to believe that 
only under unusual circumstances o f retrenchment in fore ign exchange 
outlays can any case be made f o r impeding current export earnings, or 
endangering future export earnings, by f a i l i n g t o make ava i lab le the 
necessary imported raw materials or components f o r exports. 
While some steps t o increase the p r i o r i t y of exports should be 
r e l a t i v e l y easy, others may well be f e a s i b l e only gradually. Some 
countries may f ind that the domestic employment consequences of 
s h i f t s in the incentive structure away from the home market are 
unacceptable in the short-term. Given the increasing emphasis in the 
region on production f o r export , and the pressures f o r e f f i c i e n c y 
which th i s en ta i l s , and the disenchantment with creating, and then 
perpetuating, protected import-substitution monopolies, e s p e c i a l l y in 
very small markets such as those in most of the region, i t would seem 
reasonable t o link the further continuation of negative l i s t i n g and 
QRs, at least f o r some sui tab le imports, t o serious e f f o r t s t o work 
toward the exportation of such products, and t o a f ixed t ime-table 
f o r phasing out such contro l s . Where such contro l s remain j u s t i f i e d 
on prac t i ca l employment grounds, the p o s s i b i l i t y of waivers (even 
automatic exceptions) should be considered - - f o r the purpose of 
allowing exporters maximum f l e x i b i l i t y t o lower the i r costs , and 
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improve the qual i ty and r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e i r products , thus making 
exports more competitive, and bringing net foreign exchange benefit 
(and poss ib ly even employment b e n e f i t s ) t o the country concerned. 
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Part II: SPECIAL MECHANISMS IN TRADE FINANCE 
A. Countertrade. (See references [46] to [60]). 
The term "countertrade" covers a wide range of trade practices 
which link the acquisition of imports in p a r t or in full to the 
reciprocal provision of exports. The aim of such practices might be 
one or more of the following: 1) Gaining new markets for exports, 
enlarging existing markets, or sustaining markets which would 
otherwise dry up for lack of conventional financing; 2) Using the 
bargaining leverage of large purchases to obtain development benefits 
such as increased domestic investment (through joint ventures and 
with transfer of technology), guaranteed long-term purchase of new 
plant output for export, or guaranteed purchase of other exports; or 
3) Obtaining imports despite such problems as lack of foreign 
exchange, inconvertibility of one or both trading partners 
currencies, acute imbalances in bilateral trade, and the breakdown of 
o r d i n a r y import financing (because of unresolved acute debt servicing 
problems and accumulation of arrears, which may have choked off 
ordinary commercial or official financing of imports). 
There are a wide variety of types of countertrade (though the 
terminology may vary somewhat among practitioners, and there is some 
overlap in the categories presented below): (See [47], p. 30; [46], 
App. 1, pp. i-iv; [50], pp. 2-4; [48], pp. 5-7; [10], p. 14). 
(1) Pure Barter: Nov/ quite rare, it is simply the direct 
exchange of goods without any monetary exchange (for example, the 
governments of two developing countries d,-; y trading agricultural 
surpluses under a single contract, to their mutual benefit). 
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(2) Counterpurchase This involves two loosely linked trade 
flows — typically here an importing developing country contracts to 
buy a fixed amount of imports for cash or credit: at the same time, 
under a separate contract, the exporter agrees to purchase a fixed 
amount of goods from the importing country (equal to part or all of 
the value of the imports in the first contract (but the goods to. be 
bought under the second contract are unrelated to the goods under the 
first contract); furthermore, the purchaser under the second contract 
may himself dispose of thè goods acquired or may turn them over to 
specialised brokers for marketing. 
(3) Advance Purchase: A special type of counter-purchase 
arrangement of use for developing countries with difficult debt 
problems (or otherwise considered to be especially risky), whereby 
they first export an agreed array of goods and have the payments 
placed into an escrow account in the recipient developed country; the 
escrow account is then used to pay for the agreed imports (and these 
imports are then shipped), thus eliminating for the exporter in the 
developed country any risk of non-payment for lack of foreign 
exchange. 
(4) Offset (or Compensation)'. Arrangements in 
connection with the purchase of high-value large-scale exports (such 
as equipment or aircraft) whereby the large sise of the prospective 
contract and the keenness of competition among alternative sources 
makes it feasible for the importing country to obtain some offset or 
compensation for awarding the contract to a particular source, in 
addition to (and often partly in place of) the usual medium or 
long-term export credits. In direct offset, the exporter agrees 
to buy some of the components for the export goods themselves from 
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the importing country, and even to provide finance, technology 
transfer, or technical assistance to make this feasible. In 
.indirect offset, the exporter agrees to purchase goods which are 
unrelated to the export project itself, with payment arrangements the 
same as in counterpurchase. (For a description of the widespread 
requirement of offsets by governments, such as those of Canada, 
Greece, Spain, Australia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, particularly in 
the connection with large military purchases, see [59]). 
(5) Buy-Back Agreements: Arrangements for the long-term 
financing of the export of capital goods or entire turnkey production 
plants to developing countries, using the export of goods produced by 
the new facility directly to pay off a substantial part of the 
investment, typically 75-80% over a 5 to 10-year period, (though some 
buy-back arrangements may call for repayment of the investment with 
the export of goody unrelated to the investment itself). 
(6) Bi lateral Clearing Agreements: Frequently used 'in the 
intra-trade of developing countries, this device involves each 
partner country opening an account in its own currency for the use of 
the.other partner at an agreed exchange rate between the two 
currencies. The clearing account has a limit set on the sise of the 
deficit in this bilateral trade, with any excess being paid in 
convertible currency. 
(7) Switch Trade: Where bilateral trade remains 
persistently unbalanced, the officials of the countries participating 
in a bilateral clearing arrangement may agree to permit the use of 
the unsettled surplus in a clearing account by swi tohing such funds 
to cover transactions involving' a third country. This is typically 
done in two ways: a) The surplus country buys goods from a third 
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;ti try -and -'the poy-ment- 'irn.-td e in hard currency by-the deficit 
count¡-v. up to a I-MJ anco in the- oJ >-aring account -• but less a 
discount which the surplus country has agreed to accept; b) The 
surplus country sells the clearing balance of the deficit country to 
a third country willing to buy further goods from the deficit 
country; the surplus country receives convertible currency less a 
discount, which it is willing to accept. Switch traders or brokers 
often act as intermediaries in arranging such transactions and may 
offer regular quotations of switch rates. 
(3) I jidvair.i&l Cooperation: This may comprise buy-back 
arrangements, or more generally agreements to provide technology 
transfers, joint ventures, and subcontracting to help support the 
industrial development of an importing developing country. 
Countertrade is often criticised by economists as being 
inefficient and leading to a misallocation of resources. But 
countertrade may itself be a means of correcting the distortions 
brought about by an unsuitable (overvalued) exchange rate, in that it 
permits selective devaluation on a case-by-case basis through the 
informal discounts on exports which are necessary to make 
countertrade transactions work. (See [47], p.16). 
Estimates differ greatly on the importance of countertrade. 
OECD has estimated ([471, pp. 11-12) that perhaps 2% (some $4 
billion) of its members' overall trade with oil-exporting developing 
countries was in the form of countertrade in 1983: some 5% ($17 
billion) was in this form in the case of OECD trade with non-oil 
exporting developing countries; about 15% ($16 billion) was in such 
form for OECD trade with East European countries! and about 2% ($16 
billion) was in countertrade form in the case of intra-OECD trade. 
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Ln addition, these c-s t i matey indicate that 10% ($13 billion) of the 
intra-trade of developing countries was in the form of countertrade, 
and 30% ($14 bi 11 ion) of developing country tra.de with East Europe 
was .hi this form. Thus, according to these OECD estimates, at most 
about $80 billion or 5% of world exports (excluding the intra-tra.de 
of East Europe and trade under bilateral clearing agreements) was in 
the form of countertrade, and, leaving out trade with East Europe, 
the total was only about $50 billion. Of course some individual 
developing countries had much higher percentages. (Less reliable 
estimates put countertrade volume as high as 25-40% of total world 
trade; estimates by IMF are much lower (1%) and GATT has estimated 
some 0 or 9% of world trade is in the form of countertrade; see C47], 
P. 11 and [48], p. 3.) 
As to the costs of countertrade arrangements, these are likely 
to be much higher than the costs of conventional trade finance 
(though not necessarily higher than the penalty costs for 
con vent ion-3'I finance facing developing countries experiencing 
difficulties in meeting external financial obligations:). For 
example, the discounts on the price of goods in the case of bulk 
commodities which are easily marketed may be only -1 to 3% while for 
manufactured goods (which are much more difficult to market) 
discounts may reach 20% or more. Commissions paid to intermediaries 
in counterpurehase or offset deals for the sale of exports from 
developing countries may vary from 0.5% to more than 5%. ([10] p.17). 
On balance, these additional selling costs may typically range from 5 
to .15% of the value of transactions -- though sometimes considerably 
¡nore, ([103 p. 18). 
Nevertheless, in intra-trade among developing countries 
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fieri p.ct from f i nancial stringency. barter deals and other 
• •i-'untertrade arrang^rnents may avoid foreign exchange expenditures, 
and thus make possible trade which would not otherwise occur. Even 
where countertrade requires costly discounts, high fees to 
intermediaries and expensive international financing, this may be a 
betr,er alternative for a country with severe debt problems than the 
inflated costs of finance for conventional trade facing such 
countries, or than being unable to proceed at all with some trade 
transactions. ([10] p. 19). In other cases, the development impact 
of foreign investment,joint ventures, technology transfer, and the 
possibility of opening up new export markets make some countertrade 
arrangements attractive to developing country governments despite 
additional costs such arrangements may face. 
In the English-speaking Caribbean region, countertrade has been 
an important trade financing; and trade policy device particularly for 
Guyana and .Jamaica -- the two countries in the region with the most 
acute foreign exchange and debt servicing problems (see Appendix, pp. 
Fi-7, below) . i ts use in intra-trade of course thereby involves a 
wider circle of Caribbean countries in such countertrade 
a r r a n g e m e n t s . 
In -Jamaica, a number of countertrade agreements have been made 
during the 1930s, involving, on the one hand, exports of bauxite or 
ft l i.irni na through the state marketing agency for these products, and on 
the other hand.., imports such as foodstuffs from the U.S., trucks and 
cars from the U.S., and prefabricated houses and construction 
materials from yugoslavia. ([47] p. 35). 
In Guyana, barter trade has come to be viewed, by some officials 
as a last resort: their experience with it suggests that Guyana may 
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be- worse off when barter is used.; in entering such deals, they 
proceed from weakness, since they often lack the information that the 
.price signals from a market at least provide -- and they feel Guyana 
is no match in most- cases for the skilled barter negotiators from 
countries with decades of experience with such techniques. The 
solution, in the view of these officials, calls for investment, 
recognising the need, to expand trade by exploiting, intensively and 
extensively, Guyana's natural resources (where its comparative 
advantage lies) and overcoming the acutely limited investment, 
technology, and management resources by bringing them in from 
neighboring countries where they are abundant — through the 
technique of joint or wholly owned ventures, which produce for export 
to countries supplying the capital, and provide for service on the 
investment and for the liquidation of past Guyanan indebtedness. 
(Such a system of ventures, while initially in the form of 
countertrade arrangements, might enable a return to normal payments 
arrangements in future trade). Arrangements of this sort have 
already begun to happen. For example, Barbados has worked out a deal 
in Guyana for cardboard boxes based on Guyanan raw materials, 
corrugated in North America by Barbadan investors in return for a 
franchise for the rest of the Caribbean market; export revenue pays 
for investment in equipment and finances import of some raw materials 
— and it also is used to reduce Guyana's indebtedness to Barbados. 
Overall, while it is not a tidy financing arrangement, the scheme 
works and additional trade i.s generated. Guyana is seeking ways to 
exploit, for example, its vast timber resources through multi-country 
ventures of this sort. 
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B. Intra-Regional Payments Arrangements. 
[See below, Appendix pages 13 to 15, and Table 7, for an 
analysis of the statistics on intra-regional trade trends from 1980 
to 1985. (Additional data, including statistics on the 
intra-regional trade of individual OECS countries, is shown in 
Supplementary Table B.)] 
The Caricom Multilateral Clearing Facility (CMCF) began in June 
1977, replacing a set of bilateral payments arrangements which had 
operated since 1969. CMCF was aimed, first, at promoting the use of 
members currencies in settling eligible transactions between 
countries in the region, thus limiting the need for foreign exchange; 
secondly, CMCF was aimed at expanding cooperation in monetary and 
banking matters, thus promoting the expansion of intra-regional 
trade. The Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago acted as agent for 
the facility, recording a country's imports from other members as a 
debit and exports to other members as a credit. Countries in overall 
deficit made settlements in foreign exchange twice annually (June 15 
and December 15) equal to 50% of amounts outstanding, and these were 
paid to creditor countries in the same proportion. Payments would 
have to be made in less than 6 months if individual country credit 
limits were exceeded. These individual country credit limits were 
established as follows (in USS million): Barbados (10.0); Belize 
(8.0); Guyana (29.5); Jamaica (27.5); OECS countries (23.0); and 
Trinidad & Tobago (2.0) -- with total credit available amounting to 
US$ 100 million. The facility thus provided additional liquidity of 
particular benefit to debtor countries with scarce foreign exchange. 
Nevertheless, the system had to be suspended at the end of March 
1983, when the credit limit was exceeded, and a major debtor (Guyana) 
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was unable to settle the required amount due. The system has since 
been replaced by a series of bilateral clearing agreements. 
The largest arrears which accumulated under CMCF were owed by 
Guyana ($98 million), with most of that owed to Barbados ($65 
million). [In early 1985, the Manufacturers Hanover Bank offered to 
buy the $65 million in arrears (at a discount said to be at least 
15%), but first the Bank wanted a binding agreement as to which 
products Guyana would provide and in what time frame: alternatively 
the Bank proposed to take the products, sell them, and then pay 
Barbados. Products proposed to be taken under the scheme by the 
Manufacturers Hanover Countertrade Department were shrimp and gold 
(although the high marketability of gold would appear to make it a 
poor candidate for a discounted countertrade deal, unless it was 
linked to some additional extractive investment). In any event, the 
arrangement was not made.] 
Interest has remained keen to restore some sort of multilateral 
payments arrangement, despite the difficulties. (It is clear from 
the data in Appendix Tables 5 and 6 that intra-trade is particularly 
important for the OECS countries, especially for exports but also for 
imports, while Guyana has been especially dependent on intra-regional 
imports). One of the issues, where views differ, is the scope of 
trade to be covered by a revived facility, i.e., whether major 
commodities such as oil and petroleum should be included or whether a 
scheme should be limited to so-called non-traditional exports. If 
the scheme were to begin modestly by initially limiting it to 
non-traditional intra-regional trade, one would need to agree on what 
is meant by traditional exports for each participating country. For 
example, for Barbados, presumably light manufacturing and electronics 
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would be non-traditional, as compared with earlier agricultural 
exports. (See Supplementary Table C for the structure of exports for 
each of 13 countries in the region). While the object initially 
should be to emphasize the creation of new add.ltional export 
flows with the support of a new clearing facility, it is not feasible 
or desirable to exclude existing flows. As the scheme proves its 
workability, member countries could agree to gradually integrate some 
more traditional "hard currency" trade flows to the mutual benefit of 
all parties. Eventually encouragement of the expansion of all export 
business, including traditional, is obviously important. 
Another aspect of a revised scheme is whether it should be 
limited to financing only the value added in the region or, if not, 
what the cut-off point should be for external import content. A 
further key question is to what extent outside resources might be 
mobilized to provide financial support for a revived scheme — and 
now such support might best be used to help stretch scarce foreign 
exchange resources and expand intra-regional trade, while maintaining 
the solvency of the arrangement. A special problem in any revival is 
how to treat the past intra-regional debt: could it be liquidated' 
within the mechanisms of any new scheme? If arrears grow, what 
provision would there be in a new scheme to pay them off? Can there 
be an automatic provision for shifting hard currency, export earnings 
to balance the clearing scheme's books after a certain delay? 
The following is an example of a proposal (unimplemented) for 
revival of a multilateral payments facility in the region: The 
Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce put forward a scheme 
[77] at the beginning of 1985 to revive a multilateral payments 
system on a limited basis in the region. It would be financed by a 
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US$ 25 million revolving fund to be subscribed by the central banks 
of the region and would be run by a Caricom Multilateral Payments 
Corporation (CMPC). The scheme was to be limited to financing trade 
in Caricom-origin commodities and for Caricom travellers Cheques 
only. Separate accounting would be provided for eligible flows, and 
settlements would be on a quarterly basis. The amounts subscribed by 
each central bank in US$ would constitute the limit of credit that 
could be extended to that particular country under the scheme. On 
each quarterly settlement date, account balances would be cleared and 
net differences determined; settlement of deficits would be 100% in 
hard currency. If a debtor central bank is unable to pay, for 
acceptable reasons, within some reasonable grace period, then the 
Corporation would arrange to purchase the debt at a discount, borrow 
funds to pay off the creditor central banks, and at the same time 
sell the debt to an extra-regional broker who could use the debt as a 
"purchase right" against a predetermined list of commodities or 
services from the debtor country, during a defined time period. In 
addition, CMPC would guarantee repayment of the debt to the broker. 
The surplus countries would in effect be financing any such 
discounts, and this should be considered as either a subsidy or an 
investment toward improving the economy of the debtor country. 
Persistent deficits that cannot be financed without discount may 
reflect real supply difficulties restricting exports, and may have to 
be handled by periodically restricting the eligibility of commodities 
for the scheme, so as to restrict the excess imports of the debtor 
and thus to achieve a viable and sustainable balance of the trade 
flows over time. 
Regional cooperation in the form of a multilateral clearing 
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arrangement (if it can be kept solvent during the time when some 
currencies in the region are inconvertible) can be seen as a step 
toward the longer-run achievement of a common currency area, which 
could provide substantial benefits to all of the countries of the 
region under suitable circumstances. Another step in that direction 
might be the creation of a Caricom unit of account (CU), based, for 
example, on a trade-weighted basket of currencies, as follows: 
Country Exchange Rate Percent of Total 
per U.S. $ Regional Trade 
(Exports + Imports) 
Trinidad & Tobago 3. 60 43 % 
Jamaica 5. 50 11 % 
Guyana 10. 00 12 % 
Barbados 2. 00 15 % 
Belize 2. 00 1 % 
OECS 2. 70 18 % 
Weighted average 4. 18 100 % 
The resulting weighted average of about 4 per U.S. dollar could be 
defined as the value of a Caricom Unit of Account (CU). Use of the 
CU for intra-regional trade would be like trading in a hard currency, 
almost. The basket of currencies making up the unit of account would 
be redefined if there were a devaluation, but the CU would provide a 
cushion against any single devaluation. For example, Barbados could 
trade with, say, Trinidad and not feel the full force of a Trinidad 
devaluation, and Trinidad would suffer slightly less than the full 
force of its own devaluation in terms of CU trade. Each of the 
central banks in the region would keep an account in CUs. A central 
administrator (in effect, the nucleus of a regional central bank) 
would get Caricom country currencies as payment for exports (at the 
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CU exchange rate for each currency). Exporters would set price in 
CUs and would be paid in their own local currency by the central 
administrator. The essence of the scheme is twofold: first, there 
is some avoidance of commercial costs of shifting in and out of hard 
currencies; but potentially important when circumstances warrant it, 
would be the possibility for automatic or controlled credit creation 
of CUs, in support of inter-regional trade expansion (perhaps in a 
manner similar to SDRs for global reserves). 
C. Debt-for-Equity and Similar Swaps. 
As the developing country debt crisis has persisted, various ad 
hoc arrangements have grown up aimed at converting some of the 
outstanding bank 1 oan debt into equity holdings. This has involved, 
in the first place, growth of an established secondary market for 
developing country debt, in which outstanding bank loans can be 
traded among banks themselves (to adjust their country risk 
exposures) or sold to third parties at deep discounts, the size of 
which depends on the prospects of the debtor country concerned. The 
following are some examples, as of mid-February 1987, of prices in 
the secondary market for sovereign loans of Latin American countries 
(as a % of face value of the loans): Argentina (64), Brazil (72), 
Chile (68), Columbia (87), Ecuador (65), Mexico (58), Peru (17), and 
Venezuela (73). (Source: [691; see also [41, p. 172-175). 
These discounts are so large as to make them attractive to 
investors if they can use them to buy local currency for projects in 
the developing country concerned. At the same time, debtor countries 
have become more positive about having multinational corporations use 
such funds for investment. Investors can take these loans to the 
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central bank or finance ministry concerned and sell them for local 
currency fat face value in some cases, as in Chile; or at a discount 
in other cases, as in Mexico). The local currency can then be used 
for an agreed investment. 
These arrangements have been in roost cases carefully controlled 
by the developing countries concerned. For example, Brazil had 
approved about $350 million in such swaps as of early 1-987. The debt 
approved for conversion was limited to over-one-year debt and to 
maturities which fell due in some specified recent period, excluding 
public bonds or guaranteed export credits or loans already 
rescheduled. At the same time the Brazilian central bank considers 
the transaction as a foreign currency investment which cannot be sold 
(or involve any repatriation of funds) for seven years. Critics of 
debt-for-equity swaps have cited their possibly inflationary impact, 
their potential for capital flight, the opportunity they provide to 
multinationals to pick up assets at bargain basement prices, and the 
possibly negative effect they may have on creditworthiness and on the 
ability to make new borrowings from abroad. 
Given the desire of many banks, including some U.S. regional 
banks, to opt out of the re-lending operations which have been 
necessary to maintain debt service by major developing country 
debtors, there is potentially a large supply of bank loans for the 
secondary market, but the pace at which debt-for-equity investment 
opportunities have opened up has been too slow to make much of a dent 
in the total developing country bank debt outstanding. 
However, at the end of 1957, a dramatic new plan was put forward 
by Mexico (which devised it in cooperation with J. P. Morgan Sr. Co. ). 
Under this plan, Mexico's outstanding foreign bank loan debt of some 
Page xi 
$ 5 3 . b i l l i o n m i g h t b e r e d u c e d b y a s much a s $ 2 0 b i l l i o n , a n d b e 
r e p l a c e d b y u p t o a n a d d i t i o n a l $ 1 0 b i l l i o n i n M e x i c a n g o v e r n m e n t 
2 0 - y e a r b o n d s — f u l l y b a c k e d b y 2 0 - y e a r U . S . g o v e r n m e n t z e r o c o u p o n 
b o n d s f u l l y d e d i c a t e d a s a g u a r a n t e e o f t h e r e p a y m e n t o f t h e M e x i c a n 
b o n d s ( a n d w h i c h M e x i c o w i l l b e a b l e t o b u y now f o r a b o u t $ 2 
b i l l i o n ) . T h e M e x i c a n b o n d s , o n c e i s s u e d , a r e e x p e c t e d t o b e e a s i l y 
m a r k e t a b l e , g i v e n t h e g u a r a n t e e . ( A n o t h e r a t t r a c t i v e f e a t u r e was a 
d o u b l i n g o f t h e i n t e r e s t s p r e a d a b o v e L I B O R w h i c h t h e b o n d s w o u l d 
c a r r y , i . e . , 2 6 / 1 6 p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t s a s a g a i n s t 1 3 / 2 6 p o i n t s f o r m o s t 
e x i s t i n g M e x i c a n b a n k d e b t . ) W h i l e m a j o r U . S . money c e n t e r b a n k s 
w e r e h o l d i n g b a c k f r o m t h e p l a n , i t a p p e a r e d l i k e l y t h a t m a n y 
E u r o p e a n a n d J a p a n e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d make b i d s f o r t h e s e b o n d s b y 
t h e d e a d l i n e o f F e b r u a r y 2 6 , 1 9 8 8 . T h e a v e r a g e d i s c o u n t e x p e c t e d , 
o r i g i n a l l y o f 5 0 % , may t u r n o u t t o b e s o m e w h a t l e s s , and. t h e t o t a l 
amount- a c c e p t e d may b e o n l y h a l f t h e o r i g i n a l e x p e c t a t i o n , b u t 
n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e p l a n i s l i k e l y t o b e c o n s i d e r e d a s u c c e s s , p r o v i d i n g 
s u b s t a n t i a l d e b t s e r v i c e r e l i e f t o M e x i c o , a n d a s u b s t a n t i a l o u t l e t 
f o r b a n k s w i s h i n g t o l i q u i d a t e t h e i r e x p o s u r e i n d e v e l o p i n g 
c o u n t r i e s . How much a p r e c e d e n t t h i s p l a n w i l l b e r e m a i n s t o b e 
s e e n , a n d w h a t e f f e c t i t w i l l h a v e on t h e a b i l i t y o f c o u n t r i e s u s i n g 
i t t o o b t a i n new b o r r o w i n g i s o f c r u c i a l i m p o r t a n c e . ( S e e [ 7 2 3 a n d 
[ 7 3 ] ) . 
I n t h e C a r i b b e a n r e g i o n , J a m a i c a a n n o u n c e d a d e b t - f o r - e q u i t y 
p r o g r a m , w i t h a new u n i t i n t h e c e n t r a l b a n k t o be a s s i g n e d t o t h i s 
w o r k a s o f A p r i l 1 9 8 7 ( s e e [ 7 0 3 ) . [ I n a b r o a c i e r c o n t e x t , J a m a i c a 
a l s o p u t f o r w a r d a p r o p o s a l f o r l i n k i n g d e b t s e r v i c i n g t o e c o n o m i c 
g r o w t h , w i t h new c r e d i t s t o b e c o n d i t i o n e d on t a r g e t e d r e d u c t i o n s o f 
d e b t s e r v i c e r a t i o s t o s u s t a i n a b l e l e v e l s o v e r a p r o g r a m m e d p e r i o d 
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( s e e [ 7 1 ] ) . ( F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f 2 4 d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s f o r m o d i f y i n g 
t h e b u r d e n o f d e b t f r o m b a n k l e n d i n g , s e e [ 4 ] , p p . 9 3 - 1 9 9 ) . ] 
D. L o n g e r - T e r m C a p i t a l S o u r c e s . 
1 . Bond F i n a n c i n g . . 
D a t a f r o m OECD ( s o u r c e [ 8 4 ] ) o n g r o s s e x t e r n a l d e b t o u t s t a n d i n g 
i n t h e f o r m o f b o n d s a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r f o u r o f t h e l a r g e r e c o n o m i e s 
o f t h e r e g i o n , a s f o l l o w s : 
B o n d s ( U S $ M i l l i o n ) 
( G r o s s D e b t O u t s t a n d i n g , " E n d o f Y e a r D a t a ) 
1 9 7 5 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 
B a r b a d o s 4 — — 1 7 1 7 36 
G u y a n a 1 2 1 4 6 6 5 6 
•Jamaica 63 1 9 5 5 0 0 
T r i n i d a d & T o b a g o 1 7 44 43 4 3 8 3 165 
O v e r t h e p a s t d e c a d e , bond f i n a n c i n g h a s b e e n g r o w i n g i n i m p o r t a n c e 
f o r T r i n i d a d & T o b a g o a n d f o r B a r b a d o s ; a t t h e same t i m e , i t h a s 
s h r u n k i n i m p o r t a n c e f o r J a m a i c a t o t h e p o i n t o f d i s a p p e a r i n g , a n d 
h a s d e c l i n e d t o a v e r y low a n d u n c h a n g e d l e v e l f o r G u y a n a . E v e n t h e 
h i g h e s t o f t h e f i g u r e s ( U S $ 1 6 5 m i l l i o n f o r T r i n i d a d ) c a m e t o o n l y 9% 
o f t o t a l d e b t o u t s t a n d i n g a n d w a s e q u a l t o o n l y 1 1 % o f m e r c h a n d i s e 
i m p o r t s i n 1 9 8 5 . I n d e e d , t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f T r i n i d a d ( a n d some s t a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e s t h e r e ) d o b o r r o w on t h e E u r o d o l l a r b o n d m a r k e t , a n d t h e 
c e n t r a l b a n k d o e s e x t e n s i v e b o r r o w i n g on t h e y e n m a r k e t ; ( t h e c e n t r a l 
b a n k a l s o d o e s some s i m p l e s w a p s a g a i n s t i t s own p o r t f o l i o ) . 
Page xi 
2. Innovative Techniques in Accessing the Capital Markets of the 
Developed Countries. 
A number of innovations, some of which have been proposed but 
not yet implemented for developing countries, could be of interest to 
Caribbean countries. A major objective for the management of 
external finance is to make sure that it contributes to the growth 
and s t a b i l i t y o f i n c o m e , a n d many o f t h e i n n o v a t i o n s d e a l w i t h 
a c h i e v i n g b e t t e r c a s h - f l o w m a t c h i n g ( a t b o t h t h e e n t e r p r i s e a n d t h e 
n a t i o n a l l e v e l ) — w h i c h means n o t o n l y o b t a i n i n g f i n a n c e when i t i s 
n e e d e d , b u t r e p a y i n g i t a t a t i m e when t h e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r y c a n 
b e s t a f f o r d t o d o s o , t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e c y c l i c a l i t y a n d 
v o l a t i l i t y o f p r o d u c t i o n , demand, a n d p r i c e s o f t h e p r i m a r y 
c o m m o d i t i e s t h a t d o m i n a t e t h e e x p o r t s o f m o s t d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , 
i n c l u d i n g t h e E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g C a r i b b e a n c o u n t r i e s . 
( a ) Int.9rest and Currency Swaps: ( R e f e r e n c e s E 6 1 1 — [ 6 8 1 ) . 
F i n a n c i a l m a r k e t s h a v e d e v e l o p e d new t e c h n i q u e s t o h e d g e a g a i n s t 
r i s k s , b u t t h e s e h a v e s o f a r been l i t t l e u s e d b y d e v e l o p i n g 
c o u n t r i e s . I n t e r e s t s w a p s a n d c u r r e n c y s w a p s a r e new m a r k e t s w h i c h 
h a v e b e e n g r o w i n g a t a v e r y r a p i d p a c e . T y p i c a l l y , i n a n interest 
swap t h e r e a r e t w o p a r t i e s , one p a r t y w i t h a f i x e d - i n t e r e s t 
o b l i g a t i o n a n d t h e o t h e r w i t h a f l o a t i n g - i n t e r e s t o b l i g a t i o n o f a b o u t 
t h e same s i z e a n d d u r a t i o n ; e a c h p a r t y a g r e e s t o s e r v i c e t h e o t h e r ' s 
o b l i g a t i o n , s i n c e t h e y f i n d t h i s t o b e m u t u a l l y a d v a n t a g e o u s . ( F o r 
e x a m p l e , o n e o f t h e p a r t i e s may h a v e h a d b e t t e r a c c e s s t o f i x e d r a t e 
d e b t a t f a v o r a b l e t e r m s , b u t p r e f e r s t o p a y f l o a t i n g r a t e s , a n d v i c e 
v e r s a . ) T y p i c a l l y , i n a currency swap t w o p a r t i e s w i t h l o a n s o f 
similar size, but each in a different currency, may find it -
advantageous to agree to have each party service t h e o t h e r ' s 
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obligation. Each party may have a comparative advantage in borrowing 
h i s own c o u n t r y ' s c u r r e n c y , b u t e a c h p a r t y may be e x p e c t i n g a f u t u r e 
s t r e a m o f f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e e a r n i n g s i n t h e o t h e r ' s c u r r e n c y ( a s w o u l d 
b e t h e c a s e f o r e x p o r t s f r o m e a c h p a r t y t o t h e o t h e r ' s c o u n t r y ) . 
C u r r e n c y s w a p s i n p a r t i c u l a r c a n r e d u c e r i s k e x p o s u r e . T h e d e b t 
c r i s i s f o r many d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s i n 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 5 was a g g r a v a t e d b y 
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i r e x p o r t s t o E u r o p e and A s i a d e c l i n e d i n d o l l a r 
v a l u e w i t h t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e d o l l a r , e r o d i n g t h e a b i l i t y o f 
t h e s e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s t o s e r v i c e t h e i r d e b t s , w h i c h w e r e m a i n l y 
d e n o m i n a t e d i n d o l l a r s . O f c o u r s e , i f t h e s e d e b t s h a d o r i g i n a l l y 
b e e n c o n t r a c t e d i n c u r r e n c i e s t h a t m a t c h e d t h e i r e x p o r t d e s t i n a t i o n s , 
t h i s r i s k c o u l d h a v e b e e n a v o i d e d . T h e same r e s u l t c a n be 
a c c o m p l i s h e d ( a t l e a s t i n t h e o r y ) t h r o u g h s w a p p i n g i n t o l i a b i l i t i e s 
d e n o m i n a t e d i n c u r r e n c i e s i n w h i c h e x p o r t p r i c e s a r e q u o t e d . ( S e e 
[ 5 ] , pp. 7 1 - 7 4 ) . T h e r e l u c t a n c e o f b a n k s t o e n t e r i n t o s w a p s w i t h 
d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s s t e m s f r o m t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e s c h e d u l i n g ; b u t 
t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f swap i n s u r a n c e may o v e r c o m e t h i s b a r r i e r . 
( b ) Combining Swaps with Export Credits: S w a p s h a v e b e e n 
c o m b i n e d w i t h e x p o r t c r e d i t s b y some OECB e x p o r t e r s i n o r d e r t o b e 
a b l e t o o f f e r l o w e r t e r m s t o b u y e r s — w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s on t h e c r e d i t t o a d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r y b u y e r c a n e n d u p 
l o w e r t h a n t h e OECD C o n s e n s u s r a t e . T h e p o t e n t i a l f o r s w a p s i n 
e x p o r t - c r e d i t s r e s t s on t h e s u b s i d y e l e m e n t t h a t i s t y p i c a l l y 
i n j e c t e d b y a s t a t e e x p o r t c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n i n o r d e r t o b r i n g 
m a r k e t r a t e f u n d s down t o C o n s e n s u s r a t e s . ( S e e P a r t I , a b o v e , 
p p . 1 1 - 1 2 ) . B y t a k i n g t h e s u b s i d y f r o m a h i g h i n t e r e s t r a t e c u r r e n c y 
( s a y , t h e N o r w e g i a n K r o n e ) and s w a p p i n g i t i n t o a l o w e r i n t e r e s t - r a t e 
c u r r e n c y ( s u c h a s t h e DM o r t h e y e n ) , t h e e x p o r t e r c a n o f f e r h i s 
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customer very a t t r a c t i v e loan terms. These deals can be complex, 
involving up to five parties -- the exporter, the buyer, a bank, the 
swap counterparty, and the export credit agency. There can be 
difficulties with these arrangements, first of all in convincing the 
buyer and his central bank and finance ministry of the advantages. 
Since it is hard to get full coverage of the credit risk from the 
export credit agency, some credit risk remains for the swap bank. If 
the purchasing developing country is itself classified as a difficult 
risk, it may be hard to find a bank willing to undertake a swap with 
the buyer. Furthermore, if the export credit involves a project with 
a long drawdown period, it may be much trickier to organize a swap. 
Nevertheless, if these difficulties can be overcome, very competitive 
credit offers to buyers in some developing countries may be avaiable 
for exploitation. (See [68]). 
(c) Jndex-Linked Bonds: The borrowing costs of developing 
countries might be reduced considerably if index-linked bonds were 
available. These would overcome many of the sources of anxiety in 
lenders minds about the future by providing for the upward revision 
of the value of the principal in line with an appropriate price index 
(and interest payments would also rise with inflation); [5] pp.81-82. 
(d) Commodity-Linked Bonds: Another device for borrowing 
that, would be helpful to developing countries dependent on the export 
of a few basic commodities is the comrnodity-1 inked bond, which would 
specify that debt service payments are to vary with the price of a 
commodity or of a basket of commodities of relevance to the borrowing 
country's economy; borrowing in this form would provide for much 
improved cash-flow matching of the country's capacity to pay and its 
debt service obligations. ([53, pp. 83-87). 
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3. Regional Capital Sources. 
There are major pools of capital in the region, or under control 
of residents of t h e region, that might be m o r e effectively mobilized 
for regional development. The major trading families, for example in 
places like Antigua, have considerable financial resources and have 
made occasional efforts at local manufacturing; they remain an 
important potential source of finance for new manufacturing or export 
ventures, (and negotiations should be undertaken in advance by the 
relevant authorities to ensure that appropriate incentives are 
provided for such ventures); such families are also potential sources 
of capital for investment in suitably designed regional development 
institutions. Similarly, the considerable wealth of Trinidad & 
Tobago makes it natural that it play a role in integrating the 
capital markets of the region, and be looked upon as a source of 
capital for the smaller or poorer countries of the region. 
The considerable fund of resident capital in the Bahamas should 
be tapped to help finance export development there, and also to help 
form, for example, a region-wide venture capital pool. A 
reinvigorated and more development-oriented Bahamas Development Bank 
might mobilize funds from the clearing banks, and particularly from 
the National Insurance Fund, which is well endowed and has excess 
funds seeking appropriate investment; the BDB could thus come to play 
a key role in developing a more balanced local economy, while 
providing significant seed money for broader venture capital 
cooperation throughout the region. The Bahamas authorities might 
indeed provide exceptionally for their local investors to access such 
a regional fund directly for investment purposes, at a favorable 
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exchange r a t e , as compared t o the present "investment d o l l a r " r a t e 
under which Bahamas residents pay some 20% as a premium over the 
regular exchange rate for investing abroad. 
Unsettled economic conditions in some of the largest economies 
of the region for more than a decade have led to the migration of 
skilled professionals and entrepreneurs from the region — and to a 
considerable amount of "capital flight" by such persons and by 
persons who continue to reside in the region. While such capital 
flight cannot by its nature be easily measured, rough estimates for 
the period 1978-1985 suggest that Trinidad & Tobago may have had 
capital flight of U.S.$ 1.5 billion, and Jamaica of perhaps U.S.$ 8 0 0 
million, and the cumulative amounts over a longer period may be 
larger. Whatever the actual amounts might be, it is clear that 
measures to re-attract such capital to the home country or to the 
region deserve serious attention; such measures might include the 
establishment of special hard currency accounts or bonds, with the 
proceeds of the foreign exchange available again for investment in 
the region. (For example, a U.S.$ bearer bond, handled by the 
commercial banks rather than the central bank, say in Jamaica, is one 
way to access the foreign exchange held abroad by residents). 
Measures to re-attract expatriates who could establish or manage 
export projects, and even finance them, would be especially valuable. 
(See also [80]). 
E. Compensatory Financing. (Reference: [74] and [75]). 
The international community is trying to devise ways to assure 
i 
adequate compensation for developing countries (particularly those 
most heavily dependent on one or a few basic commodities) for 
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s h o r t f a l l s in export earnings as compared t o p r o j e c t e d earnings 
(measuring this gap by deviations from some sort of trend line). The 
aim o f such f i n a n c i n g i s t o prov ide a cushion against the po tent ia l l y -
severe repercussions from the l o s s o f expected f o r e i g n exchange 
engendered by shortfalls, thus bridging the period o f shortage, and 
with the expectation that export earnings will r ev ive in reasonable 
time. 
Two existing facilities provide this type of bridging finance to 
developing countries: ( 1 ) the Compensatory Financing Facility o f t h e 
IMF (IMF-CFF); and (2) the STABEX scheme operated b y t h e EEC. 
IMF-CFF provides finance for shortfalls in total merchandise trade, 
while STABEX provides finance for shortfalls in certain individual 
commodity export earnings from the EEC market. Use of the IMF 
facility is always potentially subject to various IMF conditions; in 
the Third Convention on EEC aid to developing countries, conditions 
for the use of STABEX were introduced for the first time, calling for 
remedial action on the causes of shortfalls or in fostering 
diversification. Thus the use of these schemes is now not automatic, 
and many countries eligible for IMF-CFF, for example, may choose not 
to draw on it. 
IJNCTAD has for some time been studying the need for a new 
facility to complement the existing ones and to provide more adequate 
support for countries suffering earnings shortfalls, particularly 
focussed on losses in commodity exports. As part of these studies, a 
number of alternative estimates have been made of the amount of 
export shortfalls that might reasonably be subject to compensation, 
using different assumptions as to the method for establishing an 
appropriate trend line against which to measure shortfalls; these 
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techniques have been appl ied t o the actual export f l ows in the 5 -year 
period 1980-1984 (see [74]). In the tabulat ion below, the range of 
these est imates f o r each of 10 Caribbean c o u n t r i e s i s shown, in 
comparison with the actual amounts o f compensatory f inance rece ived 
by each country from IMF-CFF and STABEX during the same time per iod : 
1980-1984 Annual Averages 
(US$ Million) (As % of 
Total Exports)(£) 
(1)Estimated Actual Finance 
Export Highest Total 
S h o r t f a l l IMF-CFF STABEX S h o r t f a l l IMF-CFF 
Country (Range) Drawings Transfers Estimate +STABEX 
Antigua 0. 1-0. 3 0 0 3. , 0 0 
Barbados 3.2-6. . 3 2. 58 0 2. 9 1. 2 
Belise 2.0-8. 3 0. 77 0 12. 0 1. 1 
Domi n ica 0.5-1. .9 0. 52 0. 75 9. 3 6. 2 
Crenad a 1.1-4. 4 0. 36 0. 50 25. 1 4. 9 
Guyana 18.2-53. 4 1. 30 0 19. 6 0. 5 
Jamaica 42.9-110. 0 25. 22 0. 75 13. 6 3. o <_. 
St. Lucia 0.2-2. 1 0. 28 0. 34 5. 4 1. 6 
St. Vincent- 0.1-1. 9 0. 34 0. 23 5. 9 1. 8 
Trinidad & Tobago 1.1-6. 8 0 0 2. 4 0 
(1) Estimates used are the 4 gross formulae, without thresholds, and 
the non-fuel commodity sector basis for all 4 formulae. (Source: 
Tables 1 and 2 in [74], Addendum, and export data from Supplementary 
Table B, below). (2) Excluding petroleum exports for Trinidad. 
As can be seen in the above tabulation, existing compensatory 
financing schemes provided funds equivalent on average to more than 2 
percent of export earnings only in the case of Dominica (6.2%), 
Grenada (4.9%), and Jamaica (3 .2%) ; at the o ther extreme, three 
c o u n t r i e s rece ived l e s s than 1 percent of export earnings in t h i s 
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form — Guyana (0.5%) and Antigua and Trinidad (each, 0%). I f the 
HNCTAD secretariat estimates can be taken as a reasonable estimate of 
the need for compensatory finance, then it is clear that there is an 
important unfilled financing gap here. Expansion of compensatory 
financing facilities and the creation of new complementary 
facilities, focussed particularly on commodity export shortfalls, 
could substantially assist Caribbean countries. [Details as to the 
degree of dependence of 13 countries in the Caribbean region on a few 
commodities can be seen in Supplemetary Table C, below.] 
F. Other Trade Financing Techniques. 
1. Back-to-Back Letters of Credit and Transferable Credits. 
(References: [81]; [2], pp. 375-378; and [3], pp. 165-170). 
The problem of obtaining pre-shipment finance for an exporter 
who does not himself have adequate credit resources can often be 
solved through the use of back-to-back or transferable letters of 
credit. The back-to-back technique works as follows: An exporter 
with a firm order in hand and who is as a result the beneficiary of 
an irrevocable letter of credit issued by his customer can use that 
credit itself as security at his bank for obtaining finance to pay 
suppliers -- in effect the exporter, who may not be highly 
creditworthy can take advantage of the creditworthinessof his 
customer in order to persuade his own bank to endorse another letter 
of credit in which he, the exporter, is the applicant and his 
supplier is the beneficiary. Thus the first letter of credit is 
assigned to the exporter's bank and becomes the security for 
confirming the second "back-to-back" letter of credit. 
A variant of this arrangement involves only a single letter of 
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c r e d i t . The expor ter asks h is customer t o open a t r a n s f e r a b l e 
irrevocable documentary letter of credit in his favor, which the 
exporter , as f i r s t b e n e f i c i a r y , can t r a n s f e r t o a second b e n e f i c i a r y 
( o f t e n -the s u p p l i e r or manufacturer, when the exporter i s only a 
sales agent-). In a transferable letter of credit there is only one 
issuing bank. Under usual practices, the credit can only be 
transferred once, but the transferor can change the latest shipment 
date and the expiry date to give the exporter time to receive goods 
from the supplier and ship them to the buyer abroad. 
2. Forfaiting. (References: [37]-C45]). 
Forfaiting is a form of the familiar banking technique of 
discounting receivables [39]; it usually applies to the bills of 
exchange or promissory notes issued by importers, typically for 
medium or long-term capital goods transactions. Forfaiting uses 
funds from the free market to provide a form of fixed rate supplier-
credit to capital goods exporters [45]. The transactions under this 
technique are normally private and not officially supported. A 
special feature is that when the bills of exchange or promissory 
notes are sold to a forfait-er, they are sold without recourse to 
the exporter, so that the forfaiter takes on all of the risks of 
non-payment. Again the bills or notes can be sold in the secondary 
market arid the purchaser has no recourse t-o the original forfaiter or 
to the exporter.' A guarantee or "aval" by a bank in the buyers 
country nay be required by the forfait-er; this ensures that the risk 
in this form of commercial paper is no longer really a credit risk on 
the buyer, but rather t h e pricing of t h e forfait transaction becomes . 
mainly a function of t h e country risk of t h e importer who has 
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issued the paper. F i n a l l y , f o r f a i t paper i s t y p i c a l l y f i x e d ra te 
finance, so that an exporter can get a quotation from a forfaiter 
which will enable him to build in the costs of financing into his 
price. The typical transaction might involve the importer paying the 
exporter with, say, 10 promissory notes, each maturing at six month 
intervals; the notes will have been guaranteed by a major bank in the 
importer's country; the exporter sells these notes to a forfaiter at 
a discount which will cover the interest cost of the money over the 
five-year period, and also a margin to cover the country risk [453. 
For developing country exporters, forfaiting enables them to 
finance their exports easily and relatively inexpensively where the 
importer is sound and is in a low-risk country. Forfait transactions 
are notable for the extreme simplicity of the documentation -- which 
can be unsettling in countries not too familiar with this financing 
technique (such as the U.S.). Estimates of the volume of forfaiting 
range from $4-6 billion per year, 
Forfaiting rates for December 1987 include the following for 
paper issued by an importer in Trinidad & Tobago. The limit on 
maturity was 2 years, with payment in half-yearly installments; the 
commitment fee until pay-out 0.1% per month; the approximate discount 
rates in percent per annum were: Swiss Franc forfait rates (4.5%); 
US$ forfait rates (7.875%); and DM forfait rates (4.875%). (See 
[383). For both exporting and importing at medium or longer terms, 
forfaiting may be a useful alternative financing technique for 
Caribbean traders to examine. 
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3. Pr ivate Export Credit Insurance. 
Under the Insured Credits for Export (ICE) plan, being developed 
to cover Latin American and Caribbean countries, commercial banks in 
the U.S. would be lenders, and a trustee would be established to 
handle both funding and receivables. (At the start, the plan would 
cover only receivables -- i.e., exports to OECD countries). 
Exporters would assign receivables to the trustee who would insure 
with an overses insurer (possibly Lloyds) and act as agent for the 
central bank on funding, and the central bank would pay off 
exporters. U . S . A I D and Bankers Trust in New York were involved in 
the feasability study for this project in late 1986. (The First 
Boston Corporation has its own scheme for similar credits for Latin 
America and the Caribbean). 
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APPENDIX: A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF INTRA-REGIONAL AND 
EXTRA-REGIONAL TRADE IN THE ECONOMIES OF THE ENGLISH-
SPEAKING CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES_ 
[This section is intended to place the problems of trade 
finance in the region into better perspective, on the 
basis of the analytical and comparative data in Tables 
1 to 7.1 
1. Diversity. 
The diversity of the 13 countries (eleven of them islands) 
making up the region is strikingly shown in Table 1: Gross product 
per capita in 1985 ranges from more than US$ 7,000 in the Bahamas to 
only $500 in Guyana; total gross product exceeds US$ 7 billion in 
Trinidad & Tobago but is only $34 million in Montserrat; Jamaica has 
the largest population (2.3 million) compared to a low of 12 thousand 
in Montserrat; land area ranges from a high of 215,000 square 
kilometers in Guyana to eight countries with less than 1,000 km. sq. , 
and one of them, Monserrat, with only 100 km. sq. 
2. Growth of GDP, Trade and Tourism. 
(Table 1, cols. 5-8). During the period 1980 to 1985, GDP (at 
constant market Prices) grew very rapidly in St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines (up 32%), Dominica (up 28 %), Antigua & Barbuda (up 27%), 
and St. Lucia (up 24%); on the other hand constant-price GDP dropped 
by 15% in Guyana and by 18% in Trinidad. But since prices for many 
major export commodities of the region eroded badly, constant-price 
GDP paints either too rosy a picture (or an insufficiently bleak 
picture) — as can be seen from the fact that export earnings, 
measured in US dollars, were almost cut in half in each of the three 
most populous countries of the region (Jamaica and Guyana, each down 
46%, and Trinidad, down 48%). On the other hand, Dominica and the 
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Bahamas showed export gains over the half-decade of nearly 200%, and 
St. Vincent more than 300%. The US dollar value of imports grew the 
most in St. Vincent and in Grenada, and" declined most sharply in 
Trinidad and in Guyana. Tourism earnings in the same period grew by 
more than 50% for seven of the countries and far more than doubled 
for four of them. 
3. Relative Dependence on Imports. 
Other things being equal, the smaller the sise of a country the 
larger is likely to be its dependence on external trade — and also 
the more "open" an economy is, the greater will be its dependence on 
such trade. In Table 2, for each of the countries in the region, a 
number of major external resource flows are shown as a ratio to Gross 
Product (measured in US dollars) in 1985 — and countries of the 
region are ranked in ascending order of their dependence on 
merchandise imports. (The basic data from which the ratios were 
calculated are shown in US dollars in Table 2A). Trinidad, whose 
economy accounts for more than half the total product of the region, 
has by far the lowest import dependency ratio (.213 of its GNP), 
while the small island economies of the OECS sub-region average a 
ratio of .832 of their Gross Product. (For comparison, outside the 
region, the U.S. had a ratio of .082 in 1983, the U.K. .221, and West 
Germany .234, while in developing countries in the Americas, Brazil 
had .074, Uruguay .144, Panama .322, and Costa Rica .323 — the 
import dependency ratios are clearly much higher in the very small 
economies of the English-speaking Caribbean region). It should also 
be noted that devaluation of a country's currency will, at least 
initially, have the effect of shrinking the US dollar value of Gross 
Product relative to the value of trade flows, and this has recently 
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tended to raise the value of the import dependency ratios for Jamaica 
and Guyana. 
4. Petroleum Imports. 
Of significance, within the total for merchandise imports 
displayed in Tables 2 and 2A, are petroleum imports (shown in column 
2). These are less than 10% of imports only for three of the OECS 
islands (aside, that is, from Trinidad, the sole major producer in 
the region); for Guyana at 44% of total imports and Jamaica at 32%, 
this commodity is overwhelmingly the dominant single import. For 
these latter countries (which have the most difficult balance of 
payments problems in the region), lowered import prices for crude oil 
in the past two years have brought some easing of foreign exchange 
pressures. 
5. tierchandise Exports. 
Domestic exports of goods, shown in column 3 of Table 2, are of 
least significance in Montserrat and Antigua, amounting to only 5% of 
imports; exports for the Bahamas constitute only 28%. of imports; 
seven of the countries have exports in the range of 30 to 50% of 
imports; the exports of St. Vincent come to 78% of imports and those 
of Guyana to 91%; only Trinidad ran a surplus on merchandise trade in 
1985, with exports exceeding imports by more than a third. 
6. Tourism. 
The relatively low share of merchandise exports in financing 
imports (in all but three countries) reflects primarily the enormous 
importance of tourism earnings in the region (column 4 of Table 2); 
these amount to two-thirds of Gross Product in the case of Antigua 
and to more than half of GNP for the Bahamas (by far the largest 
tourism earner in absolute terms in the region); for six other 
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countries tourism exceeds 20% of Gross Product; tourism's share is 
especially low in Trinidad and Guyana (less than 3%). Note also that 
for six of the countries tourism earnings exceed export earnings; 
during the period 1980 to 1985, tourism grew by 52% in the Bahamas 
and by 23% in Barbados, two of the largest tourist industries in the 
region — but exports in these two countries grew even more rapidly; 
on the other hand for the other four countries where tourism exceeds 
exports, the half-decade growth of tourism outstripped exports, 
further widening the gap — with tourism growth in Antigua up 163%, 
in St. Kitts & Nevis up 157%, in Montserrat up 72%, and in Grenada up 
28%. The second largest tourist industry in the region, that of 
Jamaica, grew by 85% from 1980 to 1985 (up US$ 201 million), thus 
offsetting nearly half the US$ 452 million loss in Jamaica's export 
earnings during that period. 
7. Aid Flows. 
Column 5 of Table 2 shows aid flows, defined here as net 
disbursements of concessional assistance from bilateral and 
multilateral donors, plus non-concessional loans from official 
multilateral financing institutions), are of greatest importance for 
four countries — Grenada (36% of Gross Product), Dominica (22%), and 
Jamaica and Belize (each 15%); Guyana is next in importance (8%), 
followed by four OECS countries (5-8%); as to the rest, Antigua's 
share is only 2% and Barbados' 1%, with Trinidad and the Bahamas 
receiving essentially 0%. In Table 3, column 1, countries of the 
region are ranked according to 1985 aid flows per capita in U.S. 
dollars — ranging from a high of $361 for Grenada to a low of 40 
cents for the Bahamas; the components of these flows are shown in 
columns 2 to 4 of Table 3. Grants are especially important for 
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Grenada, Montserrat, and Dominica, accounting for more than 
two-thirds of their aid flows; on the other hand, only Jamaica has 
less than one-third of its aid in grant form — but this nevertheless 
constitutes almost half (46%) of the total grants to the region. The 
little aid received by Trinidad and the Bahamas is entirely in grant 
form (such as UNDP technical assistance); aid loans are negative, 
representing net repayments. 
8. Other Resource Flows. 
Finally, "other flows" are shown in Table 2, column 6 (including 
other net bilateral official non-concessional loans and other net 
private flows, as reported by OECD/DAC for 1985); these flows are 
only important for three countries — the Bahamas (28% of Gross 
Product, i.e., larger than export earnings, and half as large as 
tourism earnings), Antigua (13%), and Dominica (11%). 
.9. Debt Burden. 
The last column of Table 2, (col. 7), shows debt burden, the 
residue of past external resource borrowings — i.e., total disbursed 
external debt (mainly medium and long-term) outstanding at the end of 
1985, as a ratio to Gross Product (Table 2) and in US dollars (Table 
2A). Here, two of the countries in the region have debt burdens more 
than double their Gross Product — Guyana (2.8 times GNP) and Jamaica 
(2.5 times). Indeed, it is important to observe that these two 
ratios are, by a wide margin, the highest debt ratios for any 
countries in the world. Given the January 1987 devaluation of the 
Guyana dollar by 56%, this will initially have the effect of raising 
Guyana's debt ratio to well over 6 times GNP. Of course, the amount 
of debt outstanding does not directly constitute its immediate 
economic burden — that must be measured by the debt service payments 
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(principal and interest) due in the short term; the fact is that not 
much more than one-fourth of Guyana's medium and long-term debt was 
incurred in the form of concessional loans. Even more critical is 
the fact that by the end of 1985 G u y a n a had run up external payments 
arrears totalling US$ 738 million (and therefore, at least in theory, 
immediately payable); of this total, US$ 555 million represents 
arrears on short-term debt, at least part of which needs to be 
added to the overall total debt burden — thereby increasing the 
total debt figure shown by perhaps 25 to 50%; (the two main 
ponents of these arrears are of especial significance for 
-a-regional trade among CARICOM countries, arrears on the Trinidad 
& iobago bilateral account of US$ 233 million and on the CARICOM 
clearing facility account of US$ 122 million). Guyana's estimated 
debt service payments due in 1987 amount to more than U S $ 300 
million, in addition to arrears which have by now grown to more than 
US$ 800 million — compared to merchandise export earnings of only 
US$ 206 million in 1985. 
Jamaica, on its part, has benefitted from a number of debt 
rescheduling exercises since 1981 — US$ 862 million were rescheduled 
in the course of six exercises between April 1981 and September 1985. 
[A further exercise took place in March 1987]. Jamaica has in the 
past decade been a major user of IMF credit, and at the end of 1985 
such credits outstanding totalled U S $ 693 million, or more than 400% 
of its quota — the highest percentage of quota for any country in 
the world (the amount outstanding has been reduced somewhat, to US$ 
630 million, by September 1987). O n l y about 23% of Jamaica's debt 
was incurred on concessional terms. (See Table 3, cols. 5 to 9, for 
the main components of outstanding debt). Here it is interesting t o 
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note the unusually high proportion of non-concessional loans — 
multilateral "OOF" — for very heavily indebted Jamaica, and this 
continues to be true for recent lending (mainly from IBRD and IDB), 
shown in Table 3, col. 4. 
Three other countries of the region have relatively large debt 
burdens: Belize (81% of Gross Product), Dominica (75%), and Grenada 
(73%); much of Dominica's debt (73%) is concessional, compared to 38% 
for Belise and 31% for Grenada. Antigua has had problems recently 
with arrears on its public external debt, and Belise has overcome 
similar problems earlier in the 80s; debt service requirements have 
grown for Grenada, with current debt service payments up to 20% of 
exports of goods and non-factor services. 
10. Price and Volume Trends for Merchandise Trade. 
Data are available (UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and 
Development Stat i st ics estimates) for four of the main trading 
countries of the region on the dramatic changes in unit value s and 













Value Volume Value 
Unit 
Value Volume 
Barbados 156 58 270 116 89 131 65 176 
Guyana 51 75 68 64 91 71 83 57 
Jamaica 59 66 89 95 90 106 73 65 
Trinidad 53 85 62 48 92 52 93 58 
Over the five year period, prices (unit values) were down for both 
exports and imports for all four countries, with export prices down 
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most sharply for Barbados followed by Jamaica — and the terms of 
trade show the same pattern. Volume declines for both exports and 
imports were sharpest for Trinidad followed by Guyana. Jamaica also 
lost some export volume and gained slightly in import volume. 
Barbados, despite the largest drop in its terms of trade, was able to 
almost triple its export volume and to increase its import volume by 
almost one-third. Thus the purchasing power of exports soared for 
Barbados, while slumping severely for the other three countries. 
(The trade values in the above table differ slightly from those used 
in Tables 1 and 2 of this report). 
11. I rif lat ion and Exchange Rate Fluctuations. 
The three large countries with severe trade slumps in the 80s 
also had the worst inflation in the region (see Table 4, column 1). 
The very high five-year gain in the consumer price index for Jamaica 
(up 215%) was nonetheless somewhat less than the 271% increase in the 
previous five years. The high Trinidad gain (up 181%) was little 
changed from the 1975-1980 growth of 184%. However,, the worst 
inflation was the 245% rise in Guyana, an acceleration from the 
previous five-year gain of 183%. Not surprisingly, these three were 
the only countries in the region to devalue their nominal exchange 
rates against the U.S. dollar one or more times during the 1980s. 
All the other countries of the region were able to contain their CPI 
gains to between 25 and 47% from 1980 to 1985 — in every case a 
deceleration from the late 70s (and in cases such as Dominica, St. 
Vincent, and St. Lucia, very sharply lower). While the CPI is not 
the ideal tool for measuring the impact of inflation on imports and 
exports (and particularly on their unit values and production costs), 
these indexes are universally avaiable and can serve as a rough proxy 
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for more sophisticated measures. 
Nominal exchange rate changes against- the U.S. dollar between 
1980 and 1985 are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, along with 
changes up to May 1987. Did the nominal devaluations for Guyana 
(down by three-fourths), Jamaica (down by two-thirds), and Trinidad 
(down by one-third) result in real devaluations, in terms of the 
purchasing power of their currencies taking int'o account the relative 
inflation at home and in the United States? And how has the relative 
inflation in other countries of the region which have maintained 
their formal parity to the U.S. dollar affected the purchasing power 
of their currencies? Beyond this, how has the remarkable 
appreciation of the world's main trading currencies against the U.S. 
dollar from 1985 to May 1987 [and indeed into 19881 affected each of 
the region's currencies? Table 4 represents an attempt to provide a 
rough answer to each of these questions — subject only to the 
shortcomings of the CPI as a measure of changes in real export costs. 
Column 2 shows the ratio of the local CPI index number to the U.S. 
CPI -- i.e., the relative inflation rate; this is then multiplied by 
the nominal exchange rate index (column 4) to give the 
inflation-adjusted exchange rate index vis a vis the U.S. dollar 
(column 5). Similar calculations using the relative inflation rates 
and the nominal exchange rates of the U.S. dollar against the 
Canadian dollar, the U.K. pound, the German D.Mark, and the Japanese 
yen results in the estimated "real" inflation-adjusted exchange rates 
for each of the countries of the region against each of these main 
trading currencies, shown in columns 6 to 9 of Table 4. Note that an 
index value over 100 represents an appreciation of the local currency 
vis a vis the main world currency shown, with respect to t h e base 
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year (1980). The percentage changes shown for the period 1985 to 1987 
represent appreciation ( + ) or depreciation ( - ) between those two 
years. 
It is clear that the Guyana devaluations up to 1985 were 
insufficient to wipe out the effect of the wide disparities in 
inflation rates — so that the "real" rate had appreciated by 12% 
against the U.S.$, and had almost doubled against the U.K. pound and 
the German D.Mark (because of the sharp depreciation of these latter 
currencies against the US$ between 1980 and 1985). The sharp 
'evaluation of the nominal rate against the US$, in January 1987, 
" ~ time was accompanied by very large real devaluations against all 
tajor currencies — and particularly the yen and D.M. The 
Jamaican nominal devaluations up to 1985 were only partly eroded away 
by relative inflation, but the fall in the pound and the D.M. left 
those rates near the 1980 values; by 1987 the J$ had appreciated 
somewhat against the U.S.$ and Can.$, while depreciating against the 
pound, D.M. and yen. The devaluation of the Trinidad dollar by 
one-third in late 1985 had led by 1987 to a return to the 1980 real 
parity with the U.S.$, while still remaining appreciated by 25% 
against the pound as compared with 1980. The real level of the T$ 
against the yen was now more than one-fourth less than in 1980. A 
similar analysis of the change in competitive relationships for each 
of the other 10 countries of the region vis a vis each of the 5 major 
currencies can be made using Table 4. In general, by 1987, most 
countries of the region remained somewhat appreciated as. compared to 
the 1980 level, though that appreciation had come down a great deal 
between 1985 and 1987. The depreciation against the yen has been 
very large since 1985, and that rate is now well below the 1980 level 
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in "real" terms. So, as far as real exchange rates are concerned, the 
competitive opportunities for exports from the region, other things 
being equal, have improved considerably"in European markets in the 
last two years and are at a record level of depreciation vis a vis 
the yen. For the U.S. and Canadian dollars, there has been no really 
significant shift from the 1980 parities. Similarly, the real costs 
of imports from Europe and Japan, for most countries of the region 
(measured in their own currencies), have soared since 1985, while 
costs of imports from the U.S. and other sources have remained 
relatively stable. (Finally, it should be noted that this analysis 
is based on the assumption that 1980 relative currency values were 
themselves "correct" — but in fact that assumption might well be 
seriously wrong, with 1980 values, by some more sophisticated norm, 
heavily over or undervalued; so, the levels of over or undervaluation 
need deeper analysis than that given here, but the direction and 
amount of change since 1980 are valid indicators.) 
12. Direct ion of Trade. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the direction of trade, with countries 
ranked according to the importance of intra-regional trade. Thus 
Guyana bought a third of its imports from within the CAEICOM region 
in 1985; the seven OECS countries bought between 15 and 27% 
intra-regionally; and Barbados 15%. The other four countries bought 
much less (Trinidad 6%, Jamaica 4%, and less than 2% for Belize and 
the Bahamas). In the case of exports, disparities are even wider, 
with the seven OECS countries sending between 20 and 62% of their 
exports to regional markets, followed by Barbados (14%), Guyana 
(12%), and Trinidad (11)% — and much smaller shares for Jamaica, 
Belize, and the Bahamas. 
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13. Potent ial Gains and Losses from the Falling U.S. Dollar. 
Columns 3 to 9 in the direction tables show the main components 
of extra-regional trade — and make it possible to see which of the 
region's countries are likely to gain or lose on balance from the 
sharp appreciation in European and Japanese currencies since 1985. 
The share of imports from Europe and Japan exceeds the share of 
exports to them only in the case of Barbados and Trinidad, but when 
account is taken of the fact that the total value of exports equals 
less than half that of imports in almost every country of the region 
(except for Trinidad and Guyana), the net effect is that imports from 
EEC and Japan far surpass exports to them for every country shown for 
the region — except for Guyana (which had a large export surplus in 
1985) and Dominica (which about broke even on this trade). Thus, as 
far as merchandise trade is concerned, the initial impact of the 
falling dollar on the English-speaking Caribbean region has been a 
worsening deficit with Europe and Japan — but at the same time 
substantial export opportunities should be opened up, and more 
serious consideration of Lome III and GSP may be in order, to take 
advantage of the more favorable export cost situation. Shifts in 
import sources may also be warranted. Indeed, the largest potential 
gains should lie in tourism — to the extent permitted by capacity 
limitations and by price competition from other areas (many of which 
have also not appreciated against the U.S.$). 
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14. 1ntra-Regional Trade Trends. 
There is intense interest within the region in the revival of 
intra-regional trade — which fell on hard times, mirroring the more 
general payments difficulties of Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad, and 
symbolized by the breakdown by 1984 of the Caricom Multilateral 
Clearing Facility (CMCF). The especial significance of 
intra-regional trade for the seven OECS countries has already been 
mentioned in paragraph 12, above, (and in Tables 5 and 6). In 
considering measures to revive intra-regional trade, it will be 
worthwhile to have in mind how large this trade has been, how much it 
has fluctuated, how near to balance it has been and the potential for 
economising scarce foreign exchange, and which countries have 
provided the overall surpluses and which have benefitted from overall 
deficits. Table 7 provides data which should be useful in answering 
these questions. Between 1980 and 1985, the total amount of this 
trade declined by about U.S.$ 100 million (down 21%). In terms of 
different currencies, there are six areas within the. region 
(excluding the Bahamas, for which comparable data are not available, 
and whose trade in this respect is in any event very small). So, 
from the point of view of payments problems, we have first considered 
the fifteen bilateral pair relationships between the six cuurency 
areas (and we have excluded trade among the OECS countries 
themselves, since they share a common currency). In each of the six 
years shown, bilateral offsets have constituted at least 50% of "the 
total intra-regional domestic exports — and reached a high of 81% in 
1983. This means that rigid bilateral clearing arrangements alone 
would have sustained at least 50% of actual trade without any foreign 
exchange payments (but with a willingness of the central banks to 
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finance outstanding balances, with only annual settlements of any 
imbalances). On a six-year average basis (1.980-1.985) such bilateral 
offsets would have cleared 65% of the actual trade. Countries in 
overall deficit may in some cases have surpluses in some of their 
bilateral trade accounts within the region, and these surpluses can 
directly finance or offset other deficit accounts within the region 
-- thus constituting multilateral offsets, and further reducing the 
real foreign exchange requirements to finance intra-regional trade. 
These multilateral offsets have been as low as 2.4% of total exports 
(in 1983) and as high as 8.0% (in 1980), and they have averaged 5% 
over the six years; even with a network of bilateral clearing 
accounts, let us say settled annually, these multilateral offsets 
could be arranged at a common annual settlement date for all the 
bilateral accounts. This leaves an unoffset surplus which reached a 
high of 42% in 1980 and fell as low as 17% in 1983, and has averaged 
30% over the whole six years. Thus, over the 1980-1985 period, a 
total intra-regional export flow of U.S.$ 2.7 billion need only have 
required U.S.S 800 million in actual foreign exchange. 
The overall surplus and deficit position of each of the six 
currency areas for the years 1980 to 1985 are also shown in Table 7. 
Trinidad and Belize have each been consistently in overall surplus; 
Jamaica was in surplus from 1982 to 1984 (and in deficit the other 
three years); Barbados, Guyana, and the 0ECS countries have been 
consistently in overall deficit. The exports of Trinidad have made 
up more than half of total intra-regional exports (except in 1983). 
The exports of Jamaica, Barbados, and the OECS grew impressively 
between 1980 and 1983, and since then leveled off for OECS, while 
slumping badly for Barbados and especially Jamaica. Trinidad and 
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especially Guyana have had declining intra-regional exports since 
1981. Trinidad's imports soared between 1980 and 1983 -- a n d then 
collapsed sharply by 1985 (down $ 77 million); these large swings b y 
the largest economy in the region had the greatest effect o n their 
partners, but the declines in imports from peak levels in 1981 t o 
1985 were huge for Jamaica (down $58 million) and Guyana (down $42 
million). 
•v Table 1 
Relative Country Sise and Growth of Output, Trade, and Tourism 
(Countries Ranked by Gross Product Per Capita in 1985) 
Gross Total 
English- Product Gross Percent Change 1980-85: 
Speaking Per Product 
Caribbean Capita (a) Popu- GDP Imp- Exp- Tour-
Country 1985 1985 lation Area (b) orts orts ism 
US$ US$Mi11 (thous) (km sq) % % % % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bahamas 7,305 1,680(N) 230 13,940 +11 +3 +180 +52 
Trinidad 6,053 7,186(N) 1,187 5,138 -18 -26 -48 - 3 4 
Barbados 4,811 1,217(N) 253 430 -3 +14 +65 +23 
Montserrat* 2,847 34(D) 12 100 +6c +12 +55 +72 
Antigua* 1,895 152(D) 80 440 +27 +12 -22 +163 
St. Kitts* 1,226 58(D) 47 360 +9 +14 - 3 4 +157 
St. Lucia* 1,108 144(D) 130 620 +24 +1 +41 +39 
Belise 1,058 176(N) 166 22,960 +11 -15 -22 +372 
Grenada* 1,001 96(D) 96 340 +12 +37 +28 +28 
Dominica* 943 79(D) 84 750 +28 +16 +182 +241 
St. Vincent* 826 86(D) 104 340 +32 +39 +317 - 1 0 
Jamaica 750 1,726(N) 2,300 10,990 -0 - 4 -46 +84 
Guyana 515 407(N) 791 214,970 -16 -42 -46 -13d 
Total . . 2,380 13,041 5,480 271,370 
of which:0ECS 1,174 649(D) 553 2 , 9 5 0 ' 
a) N = GNP; D = GDP. b) GDP change at constant market prices, 
c) Data from Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. d) Estimate. 
* = OECS member. 
Source: Column (1) = Column (2) divided by Column (3); Column (2), 
World Bank (for N countries) and UNECLAC and ECCB (for D countries); 
Column (3), estimates based on UNCTAD, ECLAC, and World Bank; 
Column (4), UNCTAD Handbook 1986; Column (5), World Bank; Columns (6) 




Dependence on Trade, Tourism, Aid and Other Resource Flows 
and Size of Debt Burden 
(Countries Ranked by Ratio of Imports to Gross Product) 
Data for 1985 


















(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Trinidad . 213 . 007 . 293 . 014 . 000 . 044 . 246 
Barbados . 502 . 091 . 204 . 254 . 012 . 008 . 382 
Montserrat* . 548 . 066 . 030 . 220 . 066 — . 118 
Guyana . 561 . 249 . 506 . 022(i 0 .084 -.010 2. 821 
Bahamas .584(h) .107(i) .165( j) .523 . 000 . 284 . 369 
Jamaica . 659 . 212 . 310 . 256 . 153 . 006 2. 481 
Dominica* . 697 . 072 . 331 . 125 LO CM . Ill . 747 
Grenada*' . 716 . 081 . 225 . 268 . 361 -.011 . 729 
Belise . 730 . 124 . 367 . 067 . 147 . 019 . 813 
St. Lucia* . 868 . 059 . 330 . 317 . 050 -. 001 . 264 
St. Kitts* . 883 . 064 . 271 . 352 . 077 . 004 . 241 
St. Vincent* . 923 . 075 . 723 . 175 . 067 . 023 . 291 
Antigua* . 941 . 182 . 048 . 670 . 022 . 134 .434 (f) 
Total . 395 . 073 . 277 . 152 . 032 . 016 . 667 
of which:OECS . 832 . 095 . 280 . 348 . 115 . 047 . 425 
a) Also included in total merchandise imports, Col. (1). 
b) Domestic exports (i.e., excluding re-exports). c> Net bilateral 
concessional assistance, plus total net multilateral assistance 
(concessional and non-concessional), as reported by OECD/DAC. 
d) Net bilateral "other official flows", plus net private flows, as 
reported by OECD/DAC. e) Total disbursed external debt and external 
liabilities, (mainly medium and long-term), end 1985, as reported by 
OECD/DAC. f) Data from ECLAC. g ) Estimate, h) Non-oil imports plus 
excess of oil imports over oil exports. i) Net oil imports for 
domestic use. j) Excluding oil exports. 
Source: Columns (1) to (3), CARICOM, UNCTAD and ECLAC; Column (4), 
World Bank; Columns (5) and (6), OECD/DAC; Column (7), OECD/DAC. 
Table 4 (continued) 
Dependence on Trade, Tourism, Aid and Other Resource Flows 
and Size of Debt Burden 
(Countries Ranked by Ratio of Imports to Gross Product) 




















(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Trinidad 1,526. 8 50. 8 2, 103.3 99. 1 1. 9 -315.1 1,7684 • 
Barbados 610. 8 110. 9 248. 2 309. 1 15. 1 9.6 465 
Montserrat* 18. 4 2.2 1.0 7.4 2. 2 — 4 
Guyana 228. 2 101. 2 206. 0 8.9(g) 34. 1 -4. 1 1, 148 
Bahamas 981. 3(h 180.3(i 277.0( j 879.4 0. 1 477. 3 620 
Jamaica 1,136. 9 365. 4 535. 1 441. 4 264. 6 10. 8 4, 282 
Dominica* 55. 2 5. 7 26. 2 9. 9 17. 0 8.8 59 
Grenada* 68. 8 7.8 21. 6 25. 8 34. 7 -1. 1 70 
Belize 128. 1 21. 8 64. 4 11.8 25. 8 3.4 143 
St. Lucia* 125. 0 8. 5 47. 5 45. 6 7. 2 -0. 1 38 
St. Kitts* 50. 9 3. 7 15. 6 20. 3 4. 5 0. 2 14 
St. Vincent* 7.9. 3 6.4 62. 1 15. 0 5. 8 2.0 25 
Antigua* 142. 6 27. 6 7.3 101. 6 3. 3 20. 4 66 (f) 
Total 5,152. 4 954. 2 3, 615.5 1,975.3 416. 5 212. 1 8, 702 
of which:OECS 540. 2 61.9 181. 4 225. 6 74. 6 30. 2 276 
a) Also included in total merchandise imports, Col. (1). 
b) Domestic exports (i.e., excluding re-exports). c) Net bilateral 
concessional assistance, plus total net multilateral assistance 
(concessional and non-concessional), as reported by OECD/DAC. 
d) Net bilateral "other official flows", plus net private flows, as 
reported by OECD/DAC. e) Total disbursed external debt and external 
liabilities, (mainly medium and long-term), end 1985, as reported by 
OECD/DAC. f) Data from ECLAC. g) Estimate, h) Non-oil imports plus 
excess of oil imports over oil exports. i) Net oil imports for 
domestic use. j) Excluding oil exports. 
Source: Columns (1) to (3), CARICOM, UNCTAD and ECLAC; Column (4), 
Horld Bank; Columns (5) and (6), OECD/DAC; Column (7), OECD/DAC. 
Table 4 (continued) 
Components of Aid Flows and Debt Burden 
(Countries Ranked by Amount of Aid Flows Per Capita in 1985) 
Aid Flow Components 
as % of 1985 Total 
Components of Debt (end 1985) 
as % of Total Outstanding 
Aid Bilat Bilat 
English- Flows Bilat & & 
Speaking US $ & Mult Mult Mult Mult 
Caribbean Per Mult ODA OOF ODA OOF 
Country Capita Grants Loans Loans Loans L o a m 
Use 
of Total 
IMF Ex- All 
Fund port Other 
Creds Creds Debt 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Grenada* 361. 0 92. 7 7. 6 -0. 3 31. 4 4. 3 4. 3 25. 7 34. 3 
Dominica* 202. 5 70. 5 28. 9 0. 6 72. 9 1.7 10. 2 15. 3 
Montserrat* 186. 4 8.9. 1 10. 9 - 75. 0 25. 0 - - -
Belize 155. 2 33. 8 51. 6 14. 8 38. 0 8. 4 7.0 16. 2 30. 3 
Jamaica 115. 1 28. .9 35. 0 36. 1 22. 8 13. 5 16. 2 16. 5 31. 1 
St. Kitts* 94. 9 63. 5 36. 6 - 71. 4 14. 3 - 14. 3 -
Barbados 59. 8 35. 7 19. 2 44. 9 16. 6 12. 3 10. 3 22.6 38. 1 
St. Vincent* 55. 7 48. 2 48. 5 3.6 83. 3 12. 5 - 4. 2 -
St. Lucia* 55. 5 43. 6 53. 3 3. 2 50. 0 13. 2 - 21. 1 15. 8 
Guyana 43. 1 35. 2 44. 0 20. 8 26. 9 9. 0 6.9 5.2 52. 0 
Antigua* 40. 8 54. 6 36. 5 8.9 • • • • • • 
Trinidad 1. 6 423. 7 -69. 9- 253. 8 1. 4 1. 4 - 38. 2 59. 1 
Bahamas 0. 4 900. 0 •800. 0 0. 7 2. 4 — 12. 7 84. 2 
a) Column (5) in Table 2A, divided by Column (3) in Table 1. 
b) Official bilateral and multilateral grants. c) ODA loans are 
"Official Development Assistance" (i.e., concessional loans), having 
a "grant element" of more than 25%. d) Multilateral OOF (Other 
Official Flow) loans are on non-concessional terms. e) Fund credits 
outstanding include purchases of both ordinary and borrowed resources 
of the IMF. f) Export credits include official export credits and 
guaranteed supplier credits from OECD/DAC sources. g ) Other debt 
includes other bank claims, bonds, deposits of foreigners, etc. 
Source: Columns (2) to (4), OECD/DAC, "Geographical Distribution of 
Financial Flows to Developing Countries"; Columns (5) to (9), OECD/ 
PAC, "External Debt Statistics." 
Table 4 (continued) 
Inflation-Adjusted ("Real") Exchange Rates with Main World Currencies 
(Relative Appreciation or Depreciation, 1980-1985 and 1985-1987) 



















Exchange Rates Adjusted for 
Relative Inflation (1980=100) 







Over 100 = Appreciation 
Under 100 = Depreciation 
Can- Ger-
U.S. ada U.K. many Japan 
( 1) ( 2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Guyana (G$) 
1985 244.7 1.874 
1987 [301.] 2. 222 
% Change 
Jamaica (J$) 
1985 215.3 1.649 
1987 [261.] 1.924 
% Change 
Trinidad (T$) 
1985 181.4 1.390 
1987 [203.] 1.501 
% Change 
Grenada (EC$) 
1985 147. 2 1. 128 
1987 [153.] 1.132 
% Change 
Barbados (Bar$) 
1985 144.7 1.108 
1987 [146.] 1.078 
% Change 
Belize (Bel$) 
1985 134.1 1.027 
1987 [137.] 1.014 
% Change 
Montserrat (EC$) 
1985 [134.] 1.025 























112.4 119.8 186.1 196.4 134.9 
56.7 57.3 71.6 62.8 40.9 
-4.9.6 -52.2 -61.5 -68.0 -69.7 
52.9 56.4 87.6 92.4 63.5 
62.4 63.1 78.8 69.1 45.0 
+18.0 +11.2 -10.1 -25.2 -29.1 
136.2 145.2 225.5 238.0 163.5 
100.1 101.2 126.4 110.9 72.2 
-26.5 -30.3 - 4 4 . 0 -53.4 -55.8 
112.8 120.2 186.8 197.1 135.4 
113.2 114.4 143.0 125.4 81.6 
+0.4 -4.8 -23.5 -36.4 -39.7 
110.8 118.1 183.5 193.6 133.0 
107.8 10.9.0 136.2 119.4 77.7 
-2.7 -7.7 -25.8 -38.3 -41.6 
102.7 109.5 170.1 179.5 123.3 
101.4 102.5 128.1 112.3 73.1 
-1.3 -6.4 -24.7 -37.4 -40.7 
102.5 109.3 169.7 179.1 123.1 
103.4 104.5 130.6 114.5 74.6 
+0.9 - 4 . 4 - 2 3 . 0 -36.1 - 3 9 . 4 
For notes, see next page. 
Table 4 (continued) 
Nominal Ex- Exchange Rates Adjusted for 
change Rate Relative Inflation (1980=100) 
Cons-
Country umer Ratio U.S.$ Over 100 = Appreciation 
(and Price to US Per . Under 100 = Depreciation 
Local Index CPI Unit 
Curr- (1980 (1980 Local (1980 Can- G e r -
ency) Year =100) =100) Curr. =100) U.S. ada U.K. many Japan 
U.S.S Can.$ Pound D.M. Yen 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
St. Vincent (ECS) 
1985 133.6 1.023 .3704 100.0 102.3 109.1 169.4 178.8 122.8 
1987 [136.] 1.000 .3704 100.0 100.0 101.1 126.3 110.8 72.1 
% Change 0.0 -2.3 -7.3 - 2 5 . 4 - 3 8 . 0 -41.3 
Bahamas (Bah$) 
1985 133.2 1.020 1. 0000 100.0 102.0 108.7 168.-9 178.2 122.5 
1987 [147.] 1.088 1.0000 100.0 108.8 110.8 137.4 120.5 78.5 
% Change 0.0 +6.7 +1.9 -18.7 -32.3 -35.9 
Dominica (EC$) 
1985 128.5 .984 





98.4 104.9 162.9 172.0 118.1 
102.9 104.0 130.0 114.0 74.2 
+4.6 -0.9 -20.2 -33.7 -37.2 




967 .3704 100.0 
981 .3704 100.0 
0. 0 
96.7 103.1 160.1 169.0 116.1 
98.1 99.2 123.9 108.7 70.7 
+1.5 -3.8 -22.6 -35.7 -39.1 




960 .3704 100.0 
957 .3704 100.0 
0. 0 
96.0 102.3 159.0 167.8 115.2 
95.7 96.8 120.9 106.0 69.0 
-0.3 -5.4 - 2 4 . 0 -36.8 -40.1 
Antigua (EC$) 
19ÖS 124.Ô .904 





95.4 101.7 168.0 166.7 114.5 
95.4 96.4 120.5 105.7 68.8 
0.0 -5.2 -23.7 -36.6 -39.9 
Notes: Data for 1985 are annual averages; consumer price data for 
1987 are for February [data in square brackets are estimated from 
most recent statistics using most recent growth trend]; 1987 nominal 
exchange rates are those published for May 11, 1987. Column (2) 
shows the ratio of the local CPI index (Col. 1) to the U.S. CPI 
index; Columns (3) and (4) show the actual (nominal) exchange rates 
between the local currencies and the U.S. dollar; Column (2) multip-
lied by Column (4) gives Column (5), the inflation-adjusted exchange 
rate between each local currency and the U.S. dollar; Columns (6) to 
(9) are derived in similar fashion, and show inflation-adjusted 
exchange rates between each local currency and the Can.$, Pound, 
D.M., and Yen. CPI d a t a are from IMF, World Bank, and local sources. 
Table 4 (continued) 
Imports by Direction 
(Countries Ranked by Importance of Intra-Regional Trade) 
Data for 1985 in Percent of Total Imports 
English- Intra Extra of which: 
Speaking Reg- Reg-
Caribbean ional ional Other Other Other 
Country Trade Trade U. S. Can. U.K. EEC Japan Asia W. Hem 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Guyana 33. 8 66. 2 20. 5 1.5 11.4 7.3 3.3 0. 5 46. 8 
Montserrat* 27. 1 72. .9 
Grenada* 26. 5 73. 5 
Dominica* 24. 8 75. 2 25. 4 7.3 12. 2 14. 3 ( 14. 4 ) 
Antigua* 23. 2 76. 8 
St. Lucia* 19. 1 80. 9 
St. Vincent* 18. 3 81. 7 
St. Kitts* 15. 1 84. 9 
Barbados 14. 8 85. 2 41. 1 5. 1 9.0 6.9 4.5 2.6 11.0 
Trinidad 6. 4 93. 6 36. 9 7. 1 9.0 8.5 9. 4 2.3 13. 4 
Jamaica 4. 0 96. 0 42. 7 3. 7 5.3 5. 1 7. 1 0. 9 28. 3 
Belize 1. 8 98.2 48. 7 2.8 9.4 9.6 2.9 2.3 20.6 
Bahamas (a) 0. 5 99. 5 75. 5 2.8 2.8 7.4 ( 11.0 ) 
Total (b) 10. 3 89. 7 
of which:OECS 21. 5 78. 5 
a) Excluding trade in petroleum, except for net imports for domestic 
consumption; data from Bahamas Central Bank. b) Excluding Bahamas. 
Source: Columns (1) and (2), CARICOM; Columns (3) to (9), estimates 
based on IMF Direction of Trade data (which is incomplete for OECS 
countries); Dominica data are estimates, based on partial country 
and IMF data for 1984. 
Table 4 (continued) 
Domestic Exports by Direction 
(Countries Ranked by Importance of Intra-Regional Trade) 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
St. Vincent* 61. 7 38. 3 
Antigua* 58. 7 41. 3 
Dominica* 38. 7 61. 3 1.8 0. 0 52. 3 0. 3 0. 0 0. 0 6.9 
Grenada* 33. 9 66. 1 
Montserrat* 27. 6 72. 4 
St. Lucia* 19. 9 80. 1 
St. Kitts* 19. 6 80. 4 
Barbados 14. 2 85. 8 66. 3 1. 8 7. 3 1. 7 0. 1 0. 6 7.9 
Guyana 11. 5 88. 5 20. 7 7.2 26. 1 19. 8 5. 1 0. 1 5. 1 
Trinidad 11. 1 88. 9 59. 9 1. 4 3.7 9. 5 0. 0 1.0 12. 4 
Jamaica 7. 5 92. 5 34. 6 16. 8 17. 2 7. 7 1.3 0. 0 3. 1 
Belize 5. 1 94. 9 58. 8 5. 1 23. 0 2.0 1. 1 0. 5 3. 8 
Bahamas (a) 1. 1 98. 9 33. 3 6. 5 4. 5 15. 1 ( 39. 4 ) 
Total (b) 12. 2 87. 8 
of which:OECS 40. 2 59. 8 
a) Excluding trade in petroleum, except for net imports for domestic 
consumption; d a t a from Bahamas Central Bank. b) Excluding Bahamas. 
Source: Columns (1) and (2), CARICOM; Columns (3) to (9), estimates 
based on IMF Direction of Trade data (which is incomplete for OECS 
countries); Dominica data are estimates, based on partial country 
and IMF data for 1984. 
Table 4 (continued) 
Intra-Regional Trade Among English-Speaking Caribbean Countries, 
1980 to 1985 
Surpluses and Deficits, 
and the Extent of Bilateral or Multilateral Offsets 
Amounts in U.S.$ millions 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
OVERALL BALANCES: 
Total Intra-Regional 
Domestic Exports (a) 486, , 8 511 . 3 502 . 6 460. 7 385, . 2 386 . 2 
Bilateral Offsets 242. , 3 299, . 5 357 . 1 371. 2 287, . 0 220 . 2 
(as % of Total) (49. ,8) (58, .6) (71 . 1) (80. 6) (74, .5) (57 . 0) 
Multilateral Offsets 38. 9 32, . 6 18 . 5 11. 2 10, . 1 28, . 4 
(as % of Total) (8. 0) (6, , 4) (3 .7) (2. 4) (2, ,6) (7, .4) 
Unoffset Surplus 205. , 6 179, . 2 127 . 0 78. 3 88. , 1 137, .6 
(as % of Total) (42. 2) (35, , 1) (25 .3) ( 17. 0) (22. ,9) (35, ,6) 
SURPLUS COUNTRIES: 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Intra-Reg. Exports 302. 3 296. 0 273. 7 206. 5 195. 3 232. 6 
Intra-Reg. Imports (FOB) 100. 3 117. 1 152. 8 172. 6 132. 1 95. 8 
Surplus +202. 0 + 178. 9 + 120. , 9 + 33. 9 +63. 3 + 136. 8 
(as % of Exports) (66. 8) (60. 4) (44. 2) ( 16. 4) (32. 4) (58. 8) 
Belize 
Intra-Reg. Exports 5. 6 2. 9 6. 9 9. 4 6. 9 3. 3 
Intra-Reg. Imports (FOB) 2. 0 2. 5 2. 0 2. 1 2. 4 2. 4 
Surplus +3. 6 +0. 3 +4. 9 + 7. 3 +4. 4 +0. 9 
(as % of Exports) (64. 3) (10. 3) (71. 0) (77. 7) (63. 8) (27. 3) 
SWITCH COUNTRY: 
Jamaica 
Intra-Reg. Exports 56. 4 67. 8 77. 3 96. 6 53. 2 40. 1 
Intra-Reg. Imports (FOB) 94. 7 105. 9 76. 1 59*. 5 32. 9 47. 9 
Surplus (+), Deficit (-) -38. 3 -38. 1 + 1. 2 +37. 2 +20. 4 -7. 8 
(as % of Exports) (67. 9) (56. 2) (1. 6) (38. 5) (38. 4) (19. 5) 
For notes, see next page. 
Table 7 (continued) 
Amounts in U.S. $ millions 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
DEFICIT COUNTRIES: 
Barbados 
Intra-Reg. Exports 41.9 48.4 58.9 60.2 50.2 35.3 
Intra-Reg. Imports (FOB) 84.8 79.6 78.1 8 3 . 0 72.2 82.3 
Deficit -42.9 -31.2 -19.2 -22.8 -22.0 - 4 7 . 0 
(as % of Exports) (102.4) (64.5) (32.6) (37.9) (43.8)(133.1) 
Guyana 
Intra-Reg. Exports 53.3 59.4 39.1 32.1 25.3 23.7 
Intra-Reg. Imports (FOB) 94.6 112.3 113.4 71.9 74.8 70.0 
Deficit -41.4 -53.0 -74.2 - 3 9 . 8 -49.5 -46.3 
(as % of Exports) (77.7) (89.2)(189.8)(124.0)(195.7)(195.4) 
OECS Countries 
Intra-Reg. Exports 27.4 36.8 46.6 55.8 54.2 51.3 
Intra-Reg. Imports (FOB) 110.4 93.8 80.2 71.6 70.8 87.8 
Deficit -83.0 -56.9 -33.6 -15.7 -16.6 -36.5 
(as % of Exports) (302.9)(154.6) (72.1) (28.1) (30.6) (71.2) 
For Reference: 
Intra-Trade Among 
OECS Countries 10.0 14.7 18.4 18.2 20.0 21.6 
a) Excluding Bahamas; excluding also intra-trade among OECS countries 
(i.e., within the ECS area), which is shown separately, for 
reference, at the end of the table. Source: CARICOM data. 
Table A 
The Financing of Imports from Developed Market Economies 
(OECD Countries) to All Developing Countries 
and to Selected Caribbean Countries 
(Values in US$ Billion) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1979 
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Total Imports (CIF) 
from All Sources 
Total Imports (FOB) 
from OECD Countries: 
Value 













Type of Financing of Imports from OECD: 
Gross Medium and Long-Term 
Export Credits Disbursed 
from DAC Sources 1): 
Value 
% of Total 
28. 5 
10. 8 
Gross Disbursements of 
Official DAC Flows 2): 
(excl. Exp. Credits) 
Value 25.6 















33. 0 33. 2 











Gross Short-Term (under 1-year) 
Officially Insured Export Credits 
(Estimated) 3): 
Value (42.4) (52.4) (56.7) (52.1) (48.0) (43.2) (52.5) 
% of Total (16.0) (16.0) (16.0) (16.0) (16.0) (14.3) (17.6) 
All Other Imports 4): 
(Not Officially 
Financed or Insured) 
Value (168. 7)(209. 2)(231. 1)(206.5)(185. 7) ( 192. 7)(178.4) 
% of Total (63.6) (63.9) (65.2) (63.4) (61.9) (63.6) (59.9) 
Table A (continued) 
(Values in US$ Million) 
BAHAMAS 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Total Imports (CIF) 
from All Sources 300a) 677a) 433a) 665a) 591a) 717a) 800a) 
Total Imports (FOB) 
from OECD Countries: 
Value 
% of Total 
564 656 1,001 886 
100 100 100 100 
602 1,104 1,079 
100 100 100 
Gross Medium and Long-Term 
Export Credits Disbursed 
from DAC Sources 1): 
Value 31.6 60 .0 14.2 106.9 24.8 42 .0 97 .0 
% of Total 5.6 9 .2 1.4 12.0 4 .1 3 .8 9 .0 
Gross Disbursements of 
O f f i c i a l DAC Flows 2 ) : 
( exc l . Exp. Credi ts ) 
Value 0.7 3 .3 2 .9 7 .1 3 .5 11.6 2 .6 
% of Total 0 .12 0 .50 0.29 0 .80 0 .58 1.05 0.24 
BARBADOS 
423 522 572 551 621 659 607 
247 285 309 294 332 359 297 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gross Medium and Long-Term 
Export Credits Disbursed 
from DAC Sources 1 ) : 
Value 25.2 
% of Total 10.2 
Total Imports (CIF) 
from All Sources 
Total Imports (FOB) 
from OECD Countries: 
Value 













Gross Disbursements of 
O f f i c i a l DAC Flows 2 ) : 
( e x c l . Exp. Cred i ts ) 
Value 9 .0 13.4 30.3 30 .0 30.8 21.3 18.4 
% of Total 3.6 4.7 9 .8 10.2 9 . 3 5 .9 6 .2 
a) Excluding petroleum, which accounts f o r about 80& o f the Bahamas' 
imports from a l l sources . 
Table A (continued) 
(Values in US$ Million) 
1«79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
BELIZE 
Total Imports (CIF) 
from All Sources 140 150 162 128 112 130 128 
Total Imports (FOB) 
from OECD Countries: 
Value 















Gross Medium and Long-Term 
Export Credits Disbursed 
from DAC Sources 1): 
Value 0. 1 
% of Total 0.1 
9.7 3.0 7.7 8.7 17.3 1.7 
9.8 2.8 8.5 15.8 21.4 2.1 
Gross Disbursements of 
Official DAC Flows 2): 
(excl. Exp. Credits) 
Value 20.2 13.5 11.1 
% of Total 21.5 13.6 10.3 
9.0 18.1 10.2 22.9 
9.9 32.9 12.6 27.9 
GUYANA 
Total Imports (CIF) 
from All Sources 318 396 436 280 230 263 255 
Total Imports (FOB) 
from OECD Countries: 
Value 
% of Total 
176 
100 
2 1 2 
100 
Gross Medium and Long-Term 
Export Credits Disbursed 
from DAC Sources 1): 
Value 4.7 






















Gross Disbursements of 
Official DAC Flows 2): 
(excl. Exp. Credits) 
Value 51.2 













Table A (continued) 
(Values in US$ Million) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
JAMAICA 
Total Imports (CIF) 
from All Sources 992 1,171 1,473 1,381 1,530 1,146 1,110 
Total Imports (FOB) 
from OECD Countries: 
Value 544 512 747 746 781 738 614 
% of Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gross Medium and Long-Term 
Export Credits Disbursed 
from DAC Sources 1): 
Value 25.0 61,0 39.8 59.5 67.1 135.9 101.6 
% of Total 4.6 11.9 5.3 8.0 8.6 18.4 16.6 
Gross Disbursements of 
Official DAC Flows 2): 
(excl. Exp. Credits) 
Value 105.8 167.7 201.7 319.4 257.7 315.8 360.4 
% of Total 19.5 32.8 27.0 42.8 33.0 42.8 58.7 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 
Total Imports (CIF) 
from All Sources 2,111 3,194 3,109 3,697 2,582 2,101 1,525 
Total Imports (FOB) 
from OECD Countries: 
Value 1,043 1,407 1,339 1,749 1,426 1,177 928 
% of Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gross Medium and Long-Term 
Export Credits Disbursed 
from DAC Sources 1): 
Value 119.0 220.2 187.6 83.0 168.4 127.4 66.7 
% of Total 11.4 15.7 14.0 4.8 11.8 10.8 7.2 
Gross Disbursements of 
Official DAC Flows 2): 
(excl. Exp. Credits) 
Value 13.6 7.1 8.6 4.8 3.8 5.6 4.8 
% of Total 1.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Table 4 (continued) 
Notes: 
1) Gross Official Export Credits plus Gross Private Export Credits 
which are officially guaranteed or insured, with a duration in excess 
of one year. [In the case of Jamaica, data for gross export credits 
(medium and long-term) may include some "disbursements" under debt 
rescheduling arrangements rather than the financing of new exports.] 
2) Gross Official Flows from DAC member countries and multilateral 
agencies, including "Official Development Assistance" (ODA) and "Other 
Official Flows" (OOF), but adjusted to exclude Official Export Credits 
and Technical Assistance Grants; (it, of course, also excludes non-DAC 
financed multilateral agencies). 
3) Gross short-term (one year or less) export credits officially 
insured or guaranteed by DAC member countries. Estimates are based on 
amounts outstanding of such credits in 1.984 and 1985 for all OECD 
countries, covering exports to developing countries, on the assumption 
that one-quarter of these credits turn over 1.5 times per year and 
three-quarters of them turn over 3 times per year. 
[The estimate of officially insured or guaranteed short-term export 
credits is calculated for all developing countries as a group. 
Estimates for individual developing countries are much less certain, 
since export guarantee or insurance agencies in OECD countries are 
reluctant, to disclose the degree of their exposure vis a vis particular 
developing countries. The demand for official insurance is likely to 
be greater with respect to countries considered more risky or less 
creditworthy. On the other hand, export credit agencies limit their 
exposure in more risky countries and may indeed suspend any insurance 
on exports to the countries with the most difficult foreign exchange 
problems. Therefore, the use of the rough overall percentage for all 
developing countries (about 15 percent of total exports to developing 
countries as a group) is almost surely wrong as a means of estimating 
the situation for most individual developing countries.] 
4) This residual item covers all other exports from OECD countries to 
developing countries which are not financed by items described in notes 
1), 2), and 3), above: bank financing not officially guaranteed or 
insured, intra-multinational company transfers, cash transactions, 
countertrade arrangements, etc. This residual is accurate only if item 
2), Gross Official Flows (adjusted), actually involves disbursements 
for goods exported from OECD countries; some of these flows are in 
fact disbursed for local costs in the recipient country; other amounts 
may be untied and lead to purchases from non-OECD sources, though it is 
likely that the great bulk of t h e s e funds is in fact expended in OECD 
countries in most cases. 
Table 4 (continued) 
Domestic- Exports from E n g l i s h - S p e a k i n g C a r i b b e a n Countries: 
Total and Intra-Regional 1) 
(Value in U S $ M i l l i o n ) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Bahamas 2) : Total 2) 158 . 6 187 . 2 227 . 1 257 . 4 281 . 8 293 . 0 
of which: lntra-Reg .2) 1 . 7 4 . 7 4 . 9 1 . 3 2 . 2 3 . 2 
Barbados: Total 150, . 7 156 . 9 180 . 3 290 . 8 291 . 8 248 . 2 
lntra-Reg 41, . 9 48, 4 58 . 9 60. 2 50 . 2 35 . 3 
Belise: Total 82, , 1 66 o . c. 59 . 8 65 . 1 72, . 9 64 . 4 
lntra-Reg 5. , 6 2 . 9 6 . 9 9 . 4 6, , 9 3 . 3 
Guyana: Total 383. 4 350 . 3 234 . 3 180 . 6 210. . 8 206, . 0 
I ntra-Reg. 53. , 3 59 . 4 39 . 1 32 . 1 25, , 3 23, . 7 
Jamaica: Total 945. 2 967. , 6 747, . 7 712. . 1 687. , 8 535. , 1 
lntra-Reg. 56. 4 67. , 8 77, O , O 96, . 6 53. 2 40. 1 
Trinidad Total 4, 056. 3 3, 634. 1 2, 994, , 6 2,263. , 2 2,101. 8 2, 103. 3 
& Tobago: lntra-Reg. 302. 3 296. 0 273. , 7 206. , 5 195. 3 232. 6 
Trinidad2) Total 2) 228. 0 238. 1 285. n c. 307. 8 364. 8 381. 7 
& Tobago: lntra-Reg. 2) 79. 8 73. 0 67. 1 58. 1 37. 9 37. 8 
Antigua Total 9. 4 9. 7 10. 1 11. 1 9. 3 7. 3 
& Barbuda: lntra-Reg. 5. .9 7. 7 8. 2 10. 2 5. 5 4, 3 
Dominica: Total 9. 3 18. 7 22. 8 26. 8 24. 9 26. 2 
lntra-Reg. 5. 7 8. 1 10. 9 13. 3 11. 2 10. 1 
Grenada: Total 16. 9 18. 6 17. 7 17. 9 16. 6 21. 6 
lntra-Reg. 1. 9 3. 9 5. 7 7. 0 6. 4 7. 3 
Montserrat : Total 0. 7 1. 3 1. 0 1. 6 1. 5 1. 0 
lntra-Reg. 0. 4 0. 9 0. 7 1. 0 0. 8 0. 3 
St. Christopher/ Total 23. 5 22. 4 17. o 17. 4 19. 5 15. 6 
Nevis: Intra-Reg. 4. o Lj 3. 6 4 . 0 4. 3 4. 3 3. 1 
St.Lucia: Total 33. 7 36. 4 37 . n t 39. 6 45, 8 47. 5 
Intra-Reg. 12. 9 16. 9 17. 2 15. 7 12. 2 9. 4 
St.Vincent Total 14. 9 23. 5 31. 4 39. 5 52. 7 62. 1 
the Grenadines: Intra-Reg. 6. 3 10. 4 18. 2 22. 7 33. 9 38. 4 
1 ) " Intra--Regional" exports are def ined h e r e as from and te i the 
English-speaking C a r i b b e a n countries shown ( c o m p r i s i n g the Caricom 
region). (Exports t o t h e Bahamas are e x c l u d e d from t h e 
"Intra-Regional" d a t a but are included in t h e "Total" data). 
2) Excluding p e t r o l e u m exports. 
~7a£>/e~ Ç ' ¿V '*/t»u ^rnfc.t ¿O'e ¿V 
faut* <-'• $> 
Export structure at the SITC group 
(3-digit) level (ranked by 




Groupe de la I T O 
1 
Value 









du total : 
du f̂ s-s ) 
of " 
J es " 
of world 
u mondq 
1 ; 3 4 
Antigua and Barbuda - Anligua-et-Barbuda ( " - developing) 
All commodities 12 286 loo.oo ; 0.00 0.00 
841 Clothing except fur 3 553 28.92 • 0.02 0.01 1 
821 Furniture 1 411 11.48 ! 0.10 0.01 { 
725 Domestic electrical 1 096 8.92 1 008 0.01 
697 Household equipment 1 054 8.5« i 0 13 0.03 
715 Metalworking machin 818 6.66 1 0.16 0.01 
00) Live animals 786 6.39 : 0.07 0.02 
332 Pttroleum products 751 6.12 1 000 0.00 
031 Fish.frtsh & simply 578 4.70 ! 0.01 0.01 
893 Articles of anific 538 4.38 ! 0.04 0.01 
112 Alcoholic beverages 255 2.08 i 0.05 0.00 
533 Pigments, paints, v 210 1.71 0.08 0.00 
581 Plastic matcrials,r 192 1.56 ! 0.02 0.00 
048 Cereal preps A prep 152 1.24 004 0.00 
642 Articles of paper 122 0.99 0.02 0.00 
691 Finished structural 119 0.9" ! 001 0.00 
719 Machinery and appli 106 0.86 , 0.00 0.00 
Remainder 547 4.45 ' 
Bahamas (" -developing) 
All commodities 1 849 387 100.00 0.40 0.10 
332 Petroleum products 1 555 555 84.11 3.94 1.67 
541 Medicinal etc produ 85 206 4.61 8.57 0.58 
512 Organic chemicals 52 947 2.86 2.86 0.16 
276 Other crude mineral . ' : 29 391 1.59 4.11 0.65 
931 Special transaction 22 077 1.19 0.47 0.08 
112 Alcoholic beverages 21 186 1.15 4.32 0.26 
031 Fish fresh^imply p 17 621 0.95 0.38 0.16 
231 Crude rubber-incl.s 10 334 0.56 0.27 0.16 
599 Chemicals nes 5 773 0.31 0.82 0.04 
331 Petroleum, crude an 4 248 0.23 0.00 0.00 
682 Copper 3917 021 0.12 0.04 
714 Oif*ce machines 2 190 0.12 O.iO 0.01 
661 Cement etc building 1 720 0.09 0.14 0.04 
022 Milk and cream 1 553 0.08 1.47 0.03 
718 Machs for spcl indù 1 537 0.08 0.15 0.01 
551 Essenti oil.perfume 1403 0.08 0.69 0.09 
32 734 1.77 
SITC ¿roup 
Groupe de la (."TCI 
Value I Thousands of dollari) Valeur 1 Millren de dollars) 










Source.', ^ A a ^ 

















All commodities • . 
Electrical machiner . . 
Clothing noi of fur . 
Sugar and honey 
Elee p*r mach^wiic 
Furniture 
Margarine .shorten in 
Chemicals nes . . . . 
Office machines . . 




Structures and part 
Machines nes nonele 
Metal manufactures 
Soaps.cleanning etc . 
Remainder 
242 759 1 100.00 0.05 0.01 
86713 35.72 1.32 0.20 
36 686 15.11 0.22 0.11 
31 144 12.83 0.38 0.27 
19 630 8.09 0.65 0.08 
6 795 2.80 0.48 0.07 
4 564 1.88 6.48 0.84 
4 330 1.7« 0.61 0.03 
3 397 1.40 0.15 0.01 
3 110 1.28 0.07 0.01 
2 928 1.21 1.23 0.10 
2 481 1.02 0.51 0.03 
2 326 0.96 0.03 0.01 
2 278 0.94 0.23 0.03 
2 274 0.94 0.08 0.00 
2 238 0.92 0.22 0.02 
2226 0.92 0.78 0.08 


















All commodities . . 
Sugar and honey . . . 
Fruit preserved,pre . . 
Clothing not of fur . . 
Fish freshjimply p . 





Wood rough . . . . 
Medicinal etc produ 
Animal feeding siuf 
Live animals . . . . 
Other manufactured 
Perfumery, cosmetic 
Road motor vehicles 
Remainder 
89 722 100.00 0.02 0.00 
37 182 41.44 0.45 032 
8123 9.05 054 02\ 
7 653 8.53 0.05 0.02 
6 221 693 0.14 0.06 
4 882 5 44 0.12 0.05 
4 444 4.95 0.2S 0.05 
3 386 3.77 o xn 0.01 
3 346 3.73 0.01 0.00 
2 183 2.43 0.02 0.02 
1008 1.12 0.04 0.02 
938 1.05 0.09 0.01 
666 0.74 0.02 0.01 
568 0.63 0.05 0.01 
507 0.57 004 0.01 
495 0.55 0.21 0.02 
457 0.51 0.01 0.00 
7 662 8.54 
c\ 
C Va /tfO 
Export structure at the SITC group 
(3-digit) level (ranked by 
average 1982-1983 values) 
Individual coun t r i e s 
(continued) 
SITC group 
Group« de li CTCI 
I982-W83 
Value I Thousands of dollars) 
Valeur iStillieri Je dollars) 
A» a per ceni 
En pourcentage 






o í »or i t i 
du monde 
Dominica - Dominique (* 
All commodities . 
051 Fruit frsh nuts frs . 
554 Soaps.cleanning etc 
422 Fixed veg oil nonso 
686 Zinc 
551 Essentl oil.perfume 
Oil Meat, fresh, chille 
054 Veg etc frsh .smply 
421 Fixed veg oi ls joft . 
Remainder 
-develop ing) 
24 448 100.00 1 0.01 0.00 
I I 033 45.13 ! 0.30 0.12 
8 675 35.48 ; 2.89 0.30 
1 118 4.57 1 004 0.04 
480 1.96 1 0.20 0.03 
409 1.6- ! 0.20 0.03 
364 1.49 , 0.02 0.00 
320 1.31 i 0.01 0.0(1 
160 0.65 ; 0.01 000 
1 8S7 7.72 ; 
Grenada - Grenade (**-developing) 
All commodities . . 
OS I Fruit, fresh, and n . 
072 Coooa 
075 Spices 
841 Clothing except fur . 
031 Fish.fresh St simply . 
046 Meal and flour at w 
001 Live animals . . . . 
081 Feed -stuff for ani. . 
821 Furniture 
554 Soaps,c lea ruing & p . 
331 Petroleum, crude an 
022 Milk and cream . . . 
332 Petroleum products . 
054 Vegetables, roou A . 
896 Works of arucollec . 




















Guyana (** - d e v e l o p i n g ) 
All commodities . . 
061 Sugar and honey 
283 Nonfer base mil ore 
042 Rice 
512 Organic chemicals . 
599 Chemicals nes • 
841 Clothing not o( fur . 
112 Alcoholic beverages 
725 Domestic electrical . 
243 Wood shaped . . . . 
242 Wood rough . . . • 










































2.11 0 94 
1.88 0 29 
1 78 0.21 
1.53 0.13 



































Groupe de ta CTCI 
Value t Thousands of dollars) Vaimi (Milliers de dollars) 



























All commodities . . 
lnorg.chemicals-ele . 
Nonfer base mil ore 
Sugar and honey . . 
Alcoholic beverages 
Petroleum products . 
Clothing not of fur . 
Fruit frsh nuts frs . . 
Tobacco mfrs . . . . 
Veg etc frshjmply . 
Coffee 








All commodities . . . 
332 FHroleum products . . 
263 Cotton 
841 Clothing except fur . . 
283 Ores & concéntrales . 
061 Sugar and honey . . . 
896 Works of art.collec . . 
292 Crude vegetable mat . 
031 Foh.fresh & simply . • 
656 Made-up anicles.wh . 
711 Power generating ma 
075 Spices 
051 Fruit, fresh, and n . . 
657 Floor coverings, ta . . 
893 Anides of anific . . . 
632 Wood manufactures^ 
053 Fhiiupreserved and . . 
Remainder 
720 030 100.00 0.15 0.04 
343 588 47.72 20.96 3.87 
121 614 16.89 2.62 1.51 
46 243 6.42 0.56 0.40 
31 163 433 6J5 0.38 
23 238 3.23 0.06 0.02 
18 163 2.52 0.11 0.05 
12648 1.76 0.32 0.14 
9711 IJ5 Z.27 0.25 
8 085 1.12 0 J 2 0.11 
7414 1.03 0.08 0.07 
6 800 0.94 0.45 0.17 
6 093 0.85 2-56 0JI 
5 027 0 7 0 0.35 0.05 
4 958 0.69 0.65 0.54 
4 693 065 0.10 0.02 
4 068 0.56 0.17 0.13 
66 531 9.24 
^eloping) 
9 741 100.00 0.00 0.00 
3 344 34.33 0.01 0.00 
554 5.69 0.02 0.01 
479 4.91 0.00 0.00 
362 3.72 0.01 0.00 
309 3.17 0.00 0.00 
267 2.75 0.08 0.01 
264 2.71 0 0 2 0.01 
251 2.58 0.01 0.00 
246 2.53 0.02 0.01 
223 2.28 0.01 0.00 
216 2.21 0.03 0.02 
211 2.16 0.01 0.00 
198 2.03 0.02 0.01 
194 2.00 0.02 0.00 
158 1.62 0.02 0.00 




todita e? i * $ 
Export structure at the SITC group 
(3-digit) level (raaked by 






























(Mil l im 
de dollari) 









St Christopher and Nevis - Saint-Christ op he-et-Nevis (** -developing) 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - Saint-Vinoeni-et-Grenadines 
(••-developing) 
All commodities . . . 
| 841 Clothing not of fur . . 
; 061 Sugar and honey . . . 
, 722 Elec pwr mach^wsc 
931 Special transaction . . 
! 729 Electrical machiner. . 
: 724 Telecommunicate« 
851 Footwear 
I 332 Petroleum products. 
! 112 Alcoholic beverages 
i 031 Fish fresh^impty p . 
I 075 Spices 
| 656 Textile etc product . 
892 Printed matter . . . 
894 Toyvsporting goods. 









































































Ail commodities . . 
051 Fruit frsh nuts frs . . 
054 Veg etc frsh.smply . 
674 Im^tl univ.plate, . . 
046 Wheat etc meal or f . 
081 Anima] feeding st uf 
031 Fish frcsh^imply p . 
841 Clothing not of fur . 
697 Bue mtl household . 
864 Watches and clocks., 
121 Tobacco un mid . . . 
071 Coffee 
599 Chemicals nes . . . 
642 Articles of paper e i 
725 Domestic e lea rie e . 


























































































All commodities . . . 
Fruit frsh nuts frs . . . 
Articles of paper e . . 
Fixed veg oil nonso . . 
Clothing not pf fur . 
Alcoholic beverages 
Non-ale beverages a 
Margarinejhortenin 
Procesd anml veg oi 
Crude veg materials 
Soaps,cleanning etc . 
Food preparations n 
Spices 
Telecommunication* 
Fixed veg oilsjoft . 
Organic chemicals . 








































































All commodities . . . 
332 Petroleum products . . 
331 Crude petroleutn.etc . 
513 lnorgelemnts.oxide 
735 Ships and boats . . . . 
673 Iron and steel shap . . 
512 Organic chemicals . . 
061 Sugar and honey . . . 
521 Coal.petroleum etc . . 
711 Power machinery non 
341 Gas natural and man . 
561 Fertilizers manufac . 
734 Aircraft . . . . . . . . 
112 Alcoholic beverages . 
554 Soapsxleaning etc . . 
599 Chemicals nes . . . . 















































0 5 6 
0.07 
0.84 
1.10 
1.59 
2.39 
0.83 
1.35 
0.15 
1.30 
0.47 
1.40 
0.17 
0.23 
0.08 
0.21 
0.35 
0.03 
0.02 
0.13 
0.03 
009 
0.24 
0.04 
0.14 
I) J) 
! j 
i 
i' 
